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1 Introduction 
1.1 Presenting the thesis 
This thesis analyses the scope of process patents in field of farm animal production, and 
rights conferred to the owners of such patents. Additionally the relevant exemptions from 
patentability for these processes will be analysed. A patent is a legal right conferred on an 
inventor in respect of a specific invention entitling him to prevent others different forms of 
utilization regarding the invention for the duration of the patent protection.1 It can be 
characterized as a legal document that confers a twenty-year monopoly on the patentee, 
giving exclusive right to control the way the patented invention is exploited.2  
 
The process patents to be analysed in the following can be characterized broadly as 
biotechnological inventions. A biotechnological invention is one involving a product of or 
containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is 
produced, processed or used, or a product obtained by means of such a process.3 Biological 
material is defined by the European Court of Justice as any material containing genetic 
information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system.4  
 
Currently, several patent applications on inventions regarding processes in farm animal 
production are pending at different patent offices around the world.5 Some of these patent 
applications have been subject to debate and discussions even before there have been any 
                                                 
1 TRIPS Article 28, see also Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 309, Kolker 2000, p. 14, Stenvik 2006, p. 13.   
2 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 329.  
3 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 14 June 2001, Case c-377/98. Kingdom of the 
Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, section 3.  
4 Ibid.  
5 See Appendix.  
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indications of whether they would be granted or not.6 The patentability of inventions in the 
technical field of biotechnology is currently on the agenda in both legal7 and in other 
forums of discussion.8 In addressing the situation concerning genetic resources for farm 
animals (AnGR), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) recently noted: 
 
Rapid developments in the field of biotechnology have increasingly drawn attention to the 
issue of intellectual property rights in relation to AnGR. In the event of the introduction of 
transgenic technologies in animals used for agricultural production, the issue of animal 
patenting may become more prominent.9  
 
Under the heading ‘Emerging Legal Issues’: 
 
Animal patenting is emerging as significant issue in the livestock sector, driven in part by 
technological developments such as cloning and transgenetics, and the desire to profit from 
or promote such developments. Once again, ethical objections are raised both regarding 
patenting as such, and regarding some of the biotechnologies to which it might be applied. 
It is, however, also important to note that there are numerous practical legal issues that also 
need to be addressed – particularly related to the scope of patent protection,10 (Emphases 
added). 
 
Uncertainty regarding the scope of protection could be the result of applying the general 
system of patent protection to inventions in an area of technology that differs to some 
extent from the more traditional technologies. The most obvious difference is the ability of 
livestock to reproduce, a fact which complicates the process of identifying those animals to 
which patent rights should apply (if, for example, patented animals were to be bred with 
                                                 
6 See Fitzgerald 2005, on the possible effects of patent application WO/2005/015989 and WO/2005/017204.  
7 E.g. implementation of the EC Directive on Biotechnology.  
8 E.g. FAO, Greenpeace, League of Pastoral Peoples, Nuffield Council on Bioethics et al.    
9 Rischkowsky and Pilling 2007, pp 279– 289 
10 Ibid  
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non-patented ones).11 Furthermore long production cycles complicate decisions regarding 
when, for how long in the production cycle, and for how many generations the patent 
protection applies. Additionally the significance of these issues will depend partly on 
species and production system.12 This could thus imply differences in the uncertainty 
regarding the scope of protection from species to species.  
  
In the area of plant production it seems that policy-making, relevant legislation and 
subsequent case law have evolved further than in the case of animal production.13 This 
development could help to clarify some of the uncertainties by drawing parallels to plant 
production. However, while there are differences among various species of animals, the 
differences compared to plants are even more extensive.  
 
The FAO produced a Global Plan of Action for the sustainable use and preservation of 
animal genetic resources, and here the issue of the impact of intellectual property rights is 
also raised.14 The legal effect of patents in farm animal production seems to have attracted 
considerable interest – from policy-makers on the international, regional and national 
levels, environmentalists, farmers and breeders of varying scales, to pastoralists and 
indigenous people. Since many of these interests can be considered to be third parties in 
regard to the patentee, the scope of protection for these inventions is of importance for 
legal predictability.  
 
One goal of the patent system is to stimulate innovation for the public good and to reward 
people for useful new inventions.15 The patent system aims to achieve this by granting to 
inventors exclusive (and time-limited) rights to exploit their inventions, while also 
promoting competition and innovation by ensuring that such inventions are fully disclosed 
                                                 
11 Rischkowsky and Pilling 2007, p. 288.  
12 Ibid.  
13 See Hiemstra et al. 2006, p 18.   
14 FAO 2007 ‘Global Plan of Action’ p. 19. 
15 Kolker 2000, p. 16.  
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to the public. 16 The system is intended to balance the interests of the public with those of 
the inventors.17 This goal and balance could be seen as what legitimizes the patent system, 
and part of an analysis of the scope of protection is to look at the balance in this field of 
technology.    
 
Recently, legal changes have been made in the field of patenting biological material. Of 
particular interest for this thesis is implementation of the EC Directive on Biotechnological 
inventions (EC/98/44).18 Even though this directive specifically addresses the scope of 
protection for biotechnological patents, and to some degree regulates the extent of 
protection to the progeny of biotechnology, there are still uncertainties to the interpretation 
of the provisions, at least in part.  
 
This thesis will investigate the legal framework of patent law on biotechnological 
inventions, more in particularly the scope of protection for process patents. As these patents 
concern inventions involving living material, several moral and ethical concerns and 
objections have been noted and discussed.19 A general discussion of the moral and ethical 
issues of patentability on biotechnological inventions would fall outside the main object of 
this thesis, as this is a pure legal analysis. However, such concerns will be pointed out 
where relevant in the following.   
 
The legal point of departure is that patents shall be made available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.20 This obligation pertains to all 
Member States of the WTO, through Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. For 
                                                 
16 Nuffield Council 2002, p. 12.  
17 Ibid.  
18 EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998; 98/44/EC of 
6 July 1998. Hereinafter referred to as the Biotech Directive. 
19 Nuffield Council 2002, p. ix. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics released a report on the ethics of patenting 
DNA and concluded that, inter alia, ethical considerations should imply that granting of such patents should 
become the exception rather than the norm.    
20 TRIPS Article 27 requires this for all Member States of the WTO.    
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biotechnological inventions, in the EU/EEA this is specified in Article 3 of the Biotech 
Directive. This states that inventions that fulfil the general requirements of patent law, and 
are susceptible of industrial application, shall be patentable regardless of whether they 
concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of 
which biological material is produced, processed or used.  
 
As mentioned, this thesis focuses on the scope of patents regarding a process in farm 
animal production. By ‘scope of a patent’ is meant the extent of the exclusive right granted 
– in other words, which products or processes the patent-holder has an exclusive right to 
prevent others from exploiting commercially.21 There is a relationship between the extent 
of this protection and an infringing use of the invention, since the protection conferred is to 
be determined by interpretation of the claims, and the rights of the patent proprietor flow 
from the protection thus conferred.22 There is, however, also a distinction23 between the 
scope of protection offered and the rights conferred by the individual patent.24 The 
protection conferred by a patent is determined by the terms of the claims,25 and in 
particular by the categories of such claims and their technical features. In contrast, the 
rights conferred on the patent-holder are the legal rights which the law of designated state 
may confer upon the holder, for example, as regards the remedies available in respect of 
any infringement.26 From a European perspective this would mean that determination of the 
extent (scope) of protection conferred by a patent under EPC Article 69(1) refers to what is 
protected, in terms of category plus technical features; whereas the rights conferred by a 
patent are a matter solely for the designated Contracting States, and are related to how such 
subject-matter is protected.27 
                                                 
21 Paterson 2001, p. 573  
22 Paterson 2001, p. 577 
23 In Norwegian patent law this is referred to as the distinction between the beskyttelsesomfang of the patent 
and the innhold of the right conferred. See Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (2002-2003) p. 15. 
24 Paterson 2001, p. 577.   
25 See EPC Article 69(1), Norwegian Patents Act section 39.  
26 Paterson 2001, p. 577.   
27 Ibid.  
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For process patents this would imply that the scope of protection covers the processes 
described in the claims, and includes the subject-matter that is the result of the 
interpretation. Whether a third-party activity falls within the scope of a patent is also 
determined by the scope of the claim or claims.28 The activity of the alleged infringer is 
compared with the process described in the claims. A patent consists of one or more claims, 
where a ‘claim’ is a single sentence which defines the monopoly sought.29 In patent 
terminology, patent claims are normally divided into two30 types: patents that grant an 
exclusive right to a physical entity (a product patent), and patents that provides an 
exclusive right to a physical activity (a process patent).31 The reason for choosing process 
patents is that they, in addition to conferring exclusive right to the described process, 
extend the exclusiveness to material derived from the patented process to some extension. 
When this material is living and is capable of self-reproduction, several questions arise as 
to the scope of protection for such products and their offspring, and subsequently in regard 
to the breeders’ and farmers’ use of these animals. This implies some special 
considerations regarding the scope of indirect product protection. It extends to some degree 
to the future generations of the animals derived from the process – without, however, 
defining precisely what extent the protection limits the use of this offspring. Several 
process patents of this kind are currently pending in patent offices. 32 The implications of 
these patents have to my knowledge not been thoroughly analysed,33 partly because this is a 
                                                 
28 Kolker 2000,  p. 15.  
29 Ibid.  
30 In some terminology a third form of patent is applied, ‘use claims’. These are normally considered as 
subordinate to process claims and are often used when the product or process is non-novel and the novelty of 
the invention consist in using it in a new way or in a new field. See Stenvik 2006, p. 66.   
31 As described in the EPO case G 02/88 Mobil/Friction reducing additive [1990] EPOR 73 on page 79: 
‘There are basically two different types of claims, namely a claim to a physical entity (for example, product, 
apparatus) and a claim to a physical activity (for example, method, process, use).’ 
32 …the number of patents filed in the biotechnology sector at the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
and the European Patent Office on average increased by 13-15% p.a., compared to overall annualgrowth rates 
of only 5%.’ (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council / COM(2002) 2 final). 
See appendix.  
33 With a few exceptions: cf. Tvedt 2007a (forthcoming), Rothschild and Newman 2002.   
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fairly new field of technology and lacks the case law that could establish a judicial 
precedent. 
 
Also addressed in this thesis are the most relevant exemptions from patentability of 
biotechnological process patents. The scope of the exemptions from patentability and 
especially the exemptions on essentially biological inventions has been subject to court 
proceedings and assessed in patent theory. However, despite these proceedings and the care 
of the TRIPS negotiators in identifying the biotechnological inventions that may be 
excluded from patentability, ‘a grey area has inadvertently been created: between 
essentially biological processes (the patentability of which may be excluded), on the one 
hand, and non-biological processes (the patentability which is mandatory), on the other.’34 
The language of the exemption in the TRIPS Agreement was inspired by the text of the 
similar exemption in the EPC.35 The exemption in the EPC is derived directly from Article 
2 of the Strasbourg Convention. At the time the Strasbourg Convention was signed in 1963, 
the potential importance of biotechnology could not have been predicted.36 The growth of 
this area of technology has made determination of the scope of this exemption ‘increasingly 
critical’.37 
1.2 General purpose and background of patent law and its application to 
process patents for production of farm animal genetic resources  
Emplacing limitations on the use of resources – whether through traditional private 
property rights or through intellectual property rights – has long been a debated issue. 
Despite this debate, most of the world’s developed legal systems have had a system of 
patent law for some time.38 The earliest known English patent, for example, was granted by 
                                                 
34 de Carvalho 2005, p. 217.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Paterson 2001, p. 438.  
37 Ibid.  
38 C-377/98 section 19. 
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Henry VI to Flemish-born John of Utynam in 1449.39  Since patents are a form of property 
rights, the rationale for their justification is to be found within the justification of property 
rights in general.40  
 
The economic rationale behind the patent system is partly based on the idea that if 
resources were to be put at risk to develop a new process or product, the inventor might 
hesitate, lest the expense prove irrecoverable. Potential competitors could simply, and 
without equivalent expense, pick up and use the successful results.41 Thus the 
establishment of a patent monopoly, which enables the inventor to hold off the competition 
for a period, and ideally encourages the risk and use of resources to develop new industrial 
inventions.42 On the other hand, if the monopoly is too extensive and acts to restrain the use 
of the patented process in an excessive manner, this could halt the progress and 
development of new technology. The rationale behind the patent system is therefore to 
provide a balance between the commercial interest of the patentee and the public utilization 
of progress in various fields of innovation. In other words, the patent system is meant to 
provide an incentive for the creation of new inventions by granting the inventor a reward, 
in the form of a time-limited exclusive right. This period of exclusiveness shall secure 
coverage for expenses and ensure the inventor an adequate profit. In return the patent-
holder is obliged to publish the details of the invention as a part of the application process. 
This could in turn give an incentive to invent ‘around’ the invention, thereby leading to 
further progress and innovation in the field in question. Thus,  
 
intellectual property protection should contribute to technical innovation and the transfer of 
technology. Both producers and users should benefit, and economic and social welfare 
should be enhanced.43  
                                                 
39 Ibid.  
40 Nuffield Council 2002, p. 12. 
41 Kolker 2000, p. 16.  
42 Ibid.  
43 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (accessed 1 February 2007) 
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Since general patent law is applied to the field of biotechnology, it could be assumed that 
the same rationale is used to legitimize exclusive rights to these inventions.44 The extent of 
which the patent system creates an incentive to invest and invent is, however, difficult to 
measure, and the propensity of patents to promote innovation has at times been 
challenged.45 While patents may serve to promote innovations, it must be recognized that 
once a new product has been developed or produced by a patented process, the existence of 
a patent inhibits competition and thereby reduces the availability of the product.46 The 
balance between the two effects, and hence the outcome in terms of the economic benefits 
to society as a whole, is a matter of complex interactions between the length and scope of 
the patent and the nature of demand for the product.47 With farm animal products, the 
demand is unquestionably present, and these patents are granted exclusivity for the same 
period of time as any other patent.  
 
The question remains for the scope of protection, as to whether the nature of these 
inventions (capacity for self-reproduction) implies differences in the extent of the exclusive 
right. If the balance of the system is shifted, the patents could possibly be used as means to 
obtain favourable market positions. For example, Gura has stressed that hybrid pig lines are 
increasingly used so that breeding companies can make sure that their breeding lines are 
not used by others for further breeding purposes.48 As a consequence, she claims, thanks to 
an aggressive policy of acquisition, cooperation and patent policy in cattle and pig genetics, 
companies may soon dominate gene markets with regard to livestock production.49 
Concerning the scope of protection for processes for the production of farm animals, these 
different interests might therefore have to be considered in order to give adequate 
                                                 
44 Biotech Directive’s Preamble Recital 46.  
45 Rischkowsky and Pilling 2007, p. 286. 
46 Rischkowsky and Pilling 2007, p. 286.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Gura 2007, p. 6.  
49 Ibid.  
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protection. The inventor should be rewarded according to his efforts, but not exceeding 
this. If the scope of the patent protection is too broad, the inventor will be given an 
unintended benefit, which could result in a marked dominance or restriction on the use of 
animals, exceeding what the patent system intended. On the other hand, theoretically, if the 
patent system does not grant adequate scope, the inventor might seek other means to secure 
his exclusiveness, like concealment of the invention through trade secrets. In a wider socio-
economic perspective this could inadvertently also lead to less innovation, as some of the 
incentive to invent might decrease or it might impede the possibility to invent around the 
invention. 
 
Another aspect of the patent system is the balance between the effort invested by inventors 
and the extent of exclusive protection conferred on them. It could be argued that inventions 
involving a low level of inventiveness should accordingly be given a correspondingly 
narrower extent of protection.50 For a traditional technical invention, the inventor’s 
personal effort can normally be established, whereas with genetic resources more of the 
invention can be argued to exist already. First of all, the genetic resources that are utilized 
or further developed in a patent on a breeding process may have been subjected to 
thousands of years of natural selection. Second, many of the processes and also the genetic 
resources themselves have undergone generations of development and selection by man in 
the hands of farmers using of selective breeding.51 In other words – the final product or 
process which materializes in a patent claim may not to the same degree be the work of the 
patentee, and it has been argued by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee: 
‘[m]uch of the value of the higher life form, particularly with respect to animals, derives 
from the natural characteristics of the original organism and has nothing to do with the 
invention.’52  
 
                                                 
50 Stenvik 1999, pp. 743-749.  
51 Henson 1999.  
52 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2002, p. 12. 
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For process patents these arguments might not apply to the same extent, since the subject-
matter of such inventions is some form of technical method or procedure. However, a 
process patent for the production of a farm animal confers rights also to the product of the 
process and to some extent the future generations of these products, and the value of these 
animals is a combination of the efforts of the patented breeding method and the natural 
characteristics of the animal. Furthermore, the animals used in the process are often 
selected on the basis of specific desired traits or qualities, and these traits might be the 
result of years of selection and cross-breeding. Although this is sought compensated by the 
requirement that the patent must be sufficiently novel and involve a certain inventive step, 
it stands to show that the commercial value of the patent might have been made possible 
through the efforts of natural selection or even selection by man. The general purpose and 
rationale of the patent system might require a different approach in this field of technology. 
The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the interpretation of the relevant regulations to 
better understand some of these distinctive characteristics.  
1.3 Relevant sources of law.  
Patent law is part of a complex legal picture: each patent is granted and enforced at the 
national level, whereas changes in the law occur at the international or regional level. The 
scope of protection of patents is determined by the national courts in an infringement 
proceeding. The point of departure for determining the scope of protection for process 
patents on animal breeding methods will therefore be an interpretation of the provisions of 
the national legislation and an interpretation of the patent claims as these are formulated by 
the patent applicant. There is to my knowledge no case law with direct relevance to the 
subject-matter of this thesis. The relevant provisions in the national legislation are, 
however, to some extent harmonized by international and regional agreements or 
conventions. The methodical approach of this thesis is therefore what obligations these 
international and regional regulations impose on the implementation and interpretation of 
national legislation regarding the scope of protection for process patents on animal 
breeding methods. The mixture of different patent regulations gives rise to interpretational 
questions, as some regulations are general and technologically neutral in nature, whilst 
others apply to a specific field of technology – in this case, biotechnological process 
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patents in farm animal production. General obligations are thus imposed on a specific area, 
and the same scope of protection applies, without consideration of the possible specific 
characteristics of the subject-matter of the inventions.   
 
The point of departure here for interpreting the scope of protection for process patents in  
animal breeding will be the obligations of international regulations on patent law, mainly 
the TRIPS Agreement. Harmonization in Europe will be analysed to determine what 
obligations the EPC and the EC Biotech Directive impose on Member States as regards the 
scope of protection for the same subject-matter. The main focus will be on the Biotech 
Directive, partly because it regulates patent protection for these inventions to a greater 
extent than the EPC, which is mainly a harmonization of the application procedure and 
granting of European patents. Furthermore, the Biotech Directive is currently in the 
implementation phase in the Member States.53 The consequences have not yet become 
evident, and the effect of this directive could be important to the patent applicant and to 
third parties involved in animal breeding.  
1.3.1 International law 
The international and regional regulations on patent law often oblige Member States to 
ensure that their national legislation complies with the provisions agreed upon. The point of 
departure when establishing these obligations is an interpretation that is to be 
 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.54  
 
The starting point of interpretation should therefore be the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms 
of the treaty. However, these terms must be given a contextual interpretation in light of the 
purpose and objective. 
                                                 
53 Tvedt 2007a, p. 3, (forthcoming).  
54 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
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1.3.2 European harmonization through the EPC 
The Vienna Convention is not specifically applicable to the EPC, because it entered into 
force only for a limited number of countries and not for all Contracting States to the EPC.55 
Nonetheless, it has been recognized that the Vienna Convention provides a useful 
codification of the proper approach to the interpretation of treaties, and on the basis of this 
the Boards of Appeal have applied the Articles of the Vienna Convention to questions of 
interpretation of the EPC.56 The point of departure when interpreting the obligations of the 
EPC should therefore be interpretation in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.  
1.3.3 Interpretation of the EC Biotech Directive  
Article 1(2) of the EC Biotech Directive specifically states that the Directive shall be 
without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States pursuant to international 
agreements – ‘in particular the TRIPS Agreement’. This implies that the TRIPS 
Agreement, which establishes the general scope of protection for process patents, could be 
a relevant source for interpreting the provisions of the EC Biotech Directive Article 8(2). 
On the interpretation of directives, EC law has developed a principle which obliges the 
national courts of the Member States to interpret their national legislation in accordance 
with directives, even those that have not yet been implemented.57  
 
According to Article 253 of the EC Treaty, all legislative acts shall be supplied with a 
reasoning or explanatory rationale.58 For directives this is done through a preamble.59 The 
preamble of the Biotech Directive describes, inter alia, the purpose, goals and objectives of 
the Directive, in addition to supplying guidance as to the interpretation of central 
                                                 
55 Paterson 2001, p. 24. 
56 Paterson 2001, p. 24.   
57 Sejersted et al. 2004, p. 50.  
58 Sejersted et al. 2004, p. 51 
59 Ibid.  
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provisions.60 Some aspects of this Directive are mentioned only in the preamble, making 
the latter important for interpreting the provisions relevant to this thesis.61 
 
According to Article 16 of the Biotech Directive, the Commission is required to produce 
reports assessing developments and implications of patenting biotechnological inventions. 
These reports are, according to Article 249 of the EC Treaty, not legally binding. However, 
according to case law of the ECJ, such reports are relevant for interpretation of Community 
law, and could therefore be relevant for interpretation of the Biotech Directive as well.62  
1.4 Ongoing debate and controversy for patents regarding breeding processes 
for genetic resources  
The grant of a patent confers a time-limited exclusive right to the patentee and the 
justification for such rights and the extent of these exclusive rights are to some 
controversial. When this system is applied to inventions for processes that yield products 
that are pre-existing in nature, it seems to evoke even more debate. Prior to the 
implementation of the Biotech Directive, which specifies the patentability and scope of 
protection for biotechnological inventions within the EU/EEA, but also generally in 
discussions on applying intellectual property rights to biological material, the debates have 
been many and wide-ranging. Kamstra et al. claim that the Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions was one of the most contentious pieces of 
legislation ever passed by the European Parliament. 63 However, these discussions seem 
centred primarily on the concerns regarding product patents on genetic resources, whereas 
the implications of process patents and breeding methods for the production of genetic 
seem to have been given lower priority. However, the effect of a process patents could have 
similar implications, due to the indirect product protection. A process patent grant, in 
addition to exclusiveness to the process, an indirect product protection to the product 
                                                 
60 Matheson 2006,  p. 8.  
61 For more on this see Sejersted et al. 2004, p. 51.  
62 Sejersted et al. 2004, p. 210.  
63 Kamstra et al. 2002, p. 1 
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obtained through the process. The controversies and discussions from the implementation 
process could therefore be relevant also for determining the scope of the protection for 
process patents, as they bring into focus the varying interests and considerations of 
patenting these inventions.     
 
Another illustration of the debate comes from an environmental organization. At issue was 
a recent patent application64 regarding a breeding method for swine production where the 
organization claimed that; ‘this is a variation on a natural occurring sequence’, and that the 
company filing the patent application ‘didn't invent it’.65 The controversy could be due to a 
misconception since the extent of these patents and the scope of the rights they confer on 
the patentee is unclear.  Furthermore has been emphasized in patent theory that  
 
[t]he task of having to decide the types of subject matter that ought to be patentable 
invariably generates conflict and uncertainty. This is because patent law inevitably finds 
itself dealing with technologies that it may not yet understand. It is also because the task of 
having to decide whether to grant property rights in a particular type of invention raises a 
complex mix of legal, cultural, political and social questions.66  
 
Some of the concerns mentioned above seem to be relevant for process patents regarding 
the production of farm animals. Biotechnology is an expanding field of technology, and the 
advanced forms used in breeding are fairly new.67 It could take years to fully understand 
the technology involved in this field. This could create challenges to the legislation 
processes, and for the courts when establishing the scope of protection for these patents. It 
has also been held that as a specific field of technology becomes mature, application of the 
normal patent criteria (novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability) means that 
                                                 
64 WO 2005/015989.  
65 Fitzgerald 2005.   
66 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 362. 
67 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament Council Com(2002) 2 final: ‘Recent decades have 
seen fundamental advances in the human understanding of the biology, molecular structure, genetic basis and 
ecology of all living entities.’  
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future patents will necessarily be limited in scope because the invention in question will 
have to be distinguished from the vast array of what is already known in the field.68 But the 
converse might also be true: that when the technology is ‘immature’ it is difficult to 
establish what should be considered an adequate level of novelty and inventive step.  
 
According to the OECD Compendium of Patent Statistics applications for biotechnology 
patents to the EPO grew by 5.1% a year between 1995 and 2003.69 Also globally this field 
of technology seem to be seeing an increase in patent application. According to the same 
source, on average, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Israel and the United 
States apply for more patents in biotechnology than in any other field.70 This statistic does 
not disclose how many of these applications that concern process patents in farm animal 
production, or whether they were granted or not, but recent years have brought forth a few 
important court cases. The most debated are probably the Canadian Supreme Court case; 
Monsanto Canada Inc. vs. Schmeiser71 and the Harvard Onco-mouse case72 and the 
Novartis/Transgenic plant73 from the EPO. The court decisions to some degree draw up the 
premises for the evaluation of patentability and the scope of protection. However, when the 
courts determine the scope of protection, it is done on the basis of national legislation and 
foreign case law has only a subordinate relevance.74  Furthermore, most of the case law 
thus far, seems to involve plant genetic resources. One reason could be that the body of 
policies and regulations has been developed mainly in the plant sector.75 Some of the 
regulations and court cases, since also involving processes for the production of genetic 
                                                 
68 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2005) 312 final p 4. 
69 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Compendium of Patent Statistics, 2006 p. 20. ( 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/19/37569377.pdf ), (accessed 21 September 2007).    
70 Ibid.  
71 Monsanto Canada Inc. vs. Schmeiser, 2004 3CC 34.  
72 T 19/90 (1990) EPOR 501.  
73 T 1054/96 (1999) EPOR 123.  
74 Practice from the EPO will have direct relevance for the Norwegian courts from Norway’s entry to the EPC 
from 1 January 2008.  
75 Tvedt et al 2007a, p. 1.  
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material, can be relevant to the evaluation of animal genetic resources. For example, the 
scope of protection for these inventions is regulated by the same provisions of the Biotech 
Directive as for process patents regarding farm animals.76 However, the legal issues seem 
to differ in certain ways compared to process patents regarding farm animal genetic 
resources. Some of these differences are pointed out in a recent study commissioned by 
FAO:  
 
While plant breeders aim at development of new varieties to replace old varieties, (…), 
farm animal breeding is largely based on selection of individuals within populations based 
on a continuum of genetic material rather than complete shifts to a new breed. The farm 
animal breeders are interested in individual animals and populations, while a plant variety 
is the main focus of plant breeders. 77 
 
If the invention concerns a process for the production of a new variety of a plant, the 
evaluation of the scope of protection would differ somewhat from a process for producing 
an improved specimen of an existing animal. A new variety would more clearly define the 
scope of the invention, whilst for the animal, the infringement proceeding could involve a 
comparison with an animal of the same breed and with similar characteristics.  
 
There are also differences in the property rights to the genetic resources and also how they 
are utilized. Agriculturists will generally have to purchase seeds from the producer every 
year, thus making it less difficult for the patent-holders to enforce their rights. To utilize the 
protected genetic material, without owners consent farmers would then have to preserve 
seeds from their crops and use these instead of the licensed seeds. As for livestock farmers 
they will possess the genetic material for the whole length of the animals’ lives – or even 
longer, if e.g. semen is frozen and preserved. This could make it more difficult to enforce 
the protection of the animals derived from the patented process, and might lead to 
uncertainties regarding the scope of protection of the progeny, if a farmer were to cross a 
                                                 
76 Article 8(2).  
77 Tvedt et al. 2007b, chapter 2.1. 
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patented individual with other animals in the herd. The outcome could be opposing or 
incompatible conflicting property rights and intellectual property rights. By contrast, in the 
case of an agriculturist this problem would be unlikely to occur since the farmer would not 
have any ‘un-patented’ genetic material to cross with the patented.    
 
To summarize; the right to patent inventions regarding process for the production of farm 
animals still appears quite controversial. The debates sparked off by this controversy could 
shed light on some of the different interest that is considered to attain a balanced system. 
As the plant sector appears more evolved and has developed several bodies of policies and 
regulations,78 and it seem to be more relevant case law involving patents on plants, these 
regulations and court decisions could make contribution to the evaluation in farm animal 
sector. Here it will be important to bear in mind the differences between the two fields as 
well.   
 
The following chapter deals with to the methodical implications of the international 
character of the patent system, and gives a short presentation of the different regimes. 
Chapter 3 analyses the relevant exemptions from patentability for processes in farm animal 
production. Chapter 4 analyses the scope of protection of process patents and the rights 
conferred on the patentee through the provisions of the TRIPS agreement, the European 
Patent Convention and the EC Directive on biotechnology. Finally this is applied to the 
case of a current patent application in an attempt to analyse the scope of protection this 
specific patent will confer if granted, and the possible implications for the stakeholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Tvedt et al. 2007a, p. 1.  
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2 Introduction of the regimes  
2.1 Regional and international characteristics of patent protection 
A patent, once granted, could lose some of its value if the exclusive right obtained in one 
country only; nevertheless, patents are legal identities which are territorial by nature. A 
patent, due to the principle of sovereignty, offers protection solely within the jurisdiction of 
the nation or nations that has granted a patent. The fact that a patent by nature applies only 
in the country where it is granted can make it necessary for inventors to protect their 
inventions in several countries. This has led to international initiatives of harmonization 
and the establishment of forums seeking to establish a common global or regional patent 
system. The first international regulation of industrial protection was the 1883 Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.79 Since then other international and 
regional regulations have been established to harmonize the legislation and ensure a 
minimum level of protection globally or regionally.80 The TRIPS Agreement regulates the 
patentability and scope of protection of patent rights for Members of the WTO. For the 
protection of biotechnological inventions, the Biotech Directive EC/98/44 provides 
regulations for the EU/EEA Member States. In addition, the FAO has recently negotiated a 
global plan of action for the conservation, sustainable use, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits from the use of animal genetic resources. These negotiations have 
not yet resulted in any treaties or other regulations, but the role of intellectual property 
rights in the sector is among the issues addressed.81  
 
                                                 
79 The Paris Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  
80 In the Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol. 8 No. 3 May 2005, Tvedt emphasizes that the 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPTL) currently being negotiated in the Standing Committee of the Law of 
Patents will to some extent imply a further harmonization of patent law internationally. It would include a 
common understanding of standards governing the patent criteria, patent applications and patent claims, and 
their equivalent interpretation. See Tvedt 2007b, ‘The Path to One Universal Patent’, Environmental Policy 
and Law, Vol. 37, No. 4.   
81 For more information see http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/genetics/angrvent2007.html  
(assessed 29 September 2007.)  
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Despite various efforts, establishing a world patent system has proven to be difficult.82 The 
principle of state sovereignty and differences in the need for intellectual property protection 
reflected in the material law has made it challenging to formulate a uniform system 
regarding all aspects of patenting. At present, there exists no form of ‘global’ patents.83 
However, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), governed by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), has established a system for international patent 
applications. It provides a route through which a single patent filing at a patent office can 
be effective in all countries of the PCT, by enabling an inventor in the Member States to 
submit one application, which can eventually lead to patents being granted in all Member 
States chosen by the applicant on filing, (Articles 11.3, 22 and 24).84  If a patent application 
is filed under the PCT, a prior art search is carried out and then the application, together 
with the search report, is sent to the patent office of each of the countries designated in the 
original application, so that they may examine the application and, if they so decide, grant a 
patent.85 The PCT has no great influence on material patent law, which is the topic of this 
thesis. There are, however, currently several patent applications regarding processes for the 
production of animals pending in the system of the PCT/WIPO. Protection of these patents 
is sought globally or semi-globally, and will if granted be enforced nationally by the 
provisions to be analysed below. Furthermore, the international prior art search and a 
preliminary patentability assessment prepared through the PCT system could influence the 
granting procedures in the respective Member States. The PCT provides an applicant the 
automatic right to convert his international application into a national one.86 By this time, 
the applicant will have received the international search report and is accordingly in a 
position to make further decisions as to the scope of his invention and the extent of 
                                                 
82 E.g. negotiations in the WIPO Standing Committee on Law of the Patents, which finally broke down in 
2006 after years of deadlock: see Tvedt 2007b.   
83 Tvedt 2007b.  
84 Kolker 2000, p. 20, Stenvik 2006, p. 40.  
85 Kolker 2000, p. 20. 
86 Paterson 2001, p. 19.  
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international protection required.87 In theory, the international search report could provide 
the basis for all further substantive examination of an application: in practice, however, 
further search is often made by the patent office of the countries that carry out an 
examination of the patent application.88 On the other hand, the centralized procedure is of 
significant importance for the granting procedures in countries whose patent offices are not 
capable of undertaking their own examinations.89  
 
The European system in the EPO has been developed partly because of the increasing 
number of European patent applications, and also the need for a uniform practice in 
processing the granting of such applications, and subsequent oppositions.90 The European 
legal picture is multifaceted: the provisions of the European Union regulating the trade-
related aspects of patent law in Europe are practised by the national legislators and courts 
and operate in addition the European Patent Convention governed by the EPO. These 
regulations are also subject to the international harmonization mentioned above. 
Furthermore, there is currently no common patent system as part of the EU.  
 
The European patent system consists mainly of three elements: (1) the European Patent 
Convention, (2) EC regulations, like the Directive, and (3) national patent law of the 
contracting Member States. 91 From a national perspective – say, that of Norway – this 
implies that Norwegian legislators, the Norwegian Patent Office, the courts and third 
parties affected by patents in the area of biotechnology must take into account several 
partly overlapping regulations, case law and organizations. In addition some legislation and 
forums deals with the rights to, the preservation of and sustainable use of genetic resources. 
These do not, as a point of departure, have direct relevance for the courts in establishing the 
scope of protection. They could, however, illustrate some of the considerations implied by 
                                                 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid 
89 Bently and Sherman 2004, p. 345.  
90 Paterson 2001, Preface.  
91 Dybdahl 1999, p 15.  
 22
the contrasting interests. One example is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
which entered into force in 1993. The CBD does not have an immediate impact on patent 
law; however, it could represent a change of attitude towards the way natural resources are 
exploited which may impact on the way patents are viewed.92  
2.2 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
As intellectual property grew more important in international trade, the differences in 
national legislation became a source of tension in international economic relations. 93  The 
TRIPS Agreement sets forth principles and standards intended to ensure the availability of 
a minimum level of protection for intellectual property rights.94 It is undoubtedly the most 
comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property protection ever 
established.95 For patent rights it determines patentability and the scope of protection, and 
confers a set of rights to the patentee. However, it is technologically neutral: the same 
provisions apply for any field of technology. It stipulates that patent protection must be 
available for both products and processes, in all fields of technology.96 All main elements 
of protection are defined: the subject-matter to be protected, the rights to be conferred, 
permissible exceptions97 to those rights, and the minimum duration of protection.98 
Although the agreement establishes only minimum requirements, it contains a large 
number of regulations that oblige the Member States to apply a fairly extensive level of 
                                                 
92 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 322. 
93 ‘Understanding the WTO’: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (accessed 1 
February 2007).   
94 Correra 2007, p. 7.  
95 de Carvalho 2005, p. 28.  
96 TRIPS Article 27. 
97 Exemptions include inventions contrary to ordre public or morality; this explicitly includes inventions 
dangerous to human, animal or plant life or health or seriously prejudicial to the environment; diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals and plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes.  
98 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/intel2_e.htm (accessed 1 February 2007). 
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protection.99 Failure to uphold this level of protection could result restrictions on access to 
foreign markets and international co-operation.100 The TRIPS Agreement does, as 
mentioned, provide provisions for any invention in all fields of technology.101 This means 
that its provisions regulating the scope of protection apply for any patented invention, 
regardless of possible differences in the technologies. In their legislation, Member States 
must apply the minimum scope of protection for any patented process under TRIPS Article 
28.1 (b), regardless of differences in technology. As discussed in chapter 1 there could be 
differences for patents regarding processes for the production of animals compared to other 
technical inventions, and these distinctions would not be accounted for in a technology-
neutral agreement like the TRIPS Agreement. On the other hand, the fact that the 
provisions involve minimum standards does not mean that the TRIPS Agreement prohibits 
its members from applying a more extensive level of protection. Member States have 
national discretion regarding provisions extending beyond the minimum standards of the 
Agreement, and are permitted to specify such protection, as was done with the 
implementation of the EC Directive on biotechnology (see section 2.4).    
2.3 European Patent Convention 
The European Patent Organization was established according to the statutes of the 
Conventions on the Grant of European Patents (EPC). It provides a centralized system for 
granting European patents102 in 37 European countries.103 A patent granted by virtue of the 
Convention is called a ‘European patent’; and, according to Article 2 of the Convention, a 
European patent has the effect of and is subject to the same conditions as a national patent 
granted by each state.104 This would imply that if a process patent that confers protection 
on a breeding method for farm animals is granted by the EPO, it would come in effect in 
the European countries member to the EPC and specified in the application. This is stated 
                                                 
99 Stenvik 2006, p. 36.  
100 Stenvik 2006, p. 38.  
101 TRIPS Article 27.  
102 Paterson 2001, p. ix.  
103 http://www.epo.org/about-us.html (accessed 23 July 2007).  
104 http://www.epo.org/about-us.html (accessed 23 July 2007). 
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in Article 64(1), which provides that a patent granted under the EPC shall confer the same 
right on the owner as a national patent granted in a contracting state. The legislation of the 
individual Member States would then have to enforce and determine the scope of 
protection for these patents, according to the standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Legally, the EPC represents only a part of the European patent law. It regulates the central 
elements of the granting procedure of European patents: applications, management and 
granting of patents. As an additional effect of the EPC, the Member States have extensively 
harmonized their national patent law with the EPC material and procedural legislation.105 
The phase following the granting of a patent is generally left to national-level legislation – 
cf. Article 64(3), which states that infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by 
national law.106 However, as mentioned, the scope of the exclusive rights of patents is 
subject to the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally, in order for there to be an 
effective single granting process, it was necessary for Member States to harmonize the 
basic rules of patent law, particularly in relation to the rules on patentability and validity.107 
Also, Article 64(2) specifies the rights conferred to the owner of a process patent. Although 
the primary function is to facilitate an effective granting procedure, this implies that the 
EPC might also influence the interpretation of the material law of the Member States, since 
the convention does include provisions on the scope of protection that the Member States 
must comply with. These general rules of patent law are, as mentioned, also harmonized 
internationally108 as well as being subject to regulation and enforcement nationally. One 
consequence of this is that a patent granted at the EPO for two countries might be 
interpreted differently in each country.109 This could mean great challenges regarding 
predictability for both the proprietor of the patent and the stakeholders operating in the 
field of technology for which the patent has been granted. The EC Biotech Directive deals 
                                                 
105 Dybdahl 1999, p. 16 
106 Kamstra et al. 2002, p. 47.  
107 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 316.  
108 E.g. the TRIPS Agreement.  
109 Bently and Sherman, 2001 p. 317.  
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with some of these challenges by further specifying the patent protection for 
biotechnological inventions in the EU/EEA.   
2.4 The European Community  
The harmonization process in the patent law of the European Union has been claimed to be 
not particularly evolved, considering that it commenced as early as 1959.110 The first 
attempt at a common EU patent system was made through the establishment of the 
Community Patent Convention – which only nine Member States have signed since 1975. 
But while the European Community has not been involved in the reform of patent law to 
the same extent as in relation to trademarks and copyright, the Commission has been active 
in two areas:111 concerning the duration of patents (via the Supplementary Protection 
Certificates scheme) and, more relevant for this thesis, biotechnological inventions.112 The 
fast-expanding field of biotechnology has led to the implementation of a specialized 
directive.113 
 
EC Directive 98/44/EC seek to ensure further harmonization of patent legislation regarding 
biotechnical inventions. It started from the premise that the subject-matter of an invention 
shall not be considered unpatentable solely because it is composed of living matter.114 The 
Directive requires the Member States to protect biotechnological inventions under national 
patent law. It deals with the patentability115 and scope of protection conferred on 
biotechnological inventions.116 For process patents in farm animal breeding this implies 
                                                 
110 Stenvik 2006, p. 32. 
111 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 317.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Cf. Preamble recital (1), which stresses the importance of regulations in this field: ‘Whereas biotechnology 
and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and the 
protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental importance for the Community's 
industrial development’ (emphasis added). 
114 C-377/98 subsection 7.  
115 Articles 1–7.  
116 Articles 8–11.  
 26
that the Member States of the EU/EEA must confer rights to the process and the products 
from the application of the process, in accordance with the provisions of the Biotech 
Directive. In addition to introducing special defences,117 the Directive also establishes a 
scheme for compulsory licences and cross-licences to deal with the overlap between patent 
and plant variety protection.118  
 
The Directive requires EU/EEA Member States to protect certain biotechnological 
inventions under national patent law. This has given rise to questions as to the relationship 
between the Directive and the EPC, for example where there were conflicting regulations 
within the two. This was sought resolved by the EPO Administrative Council, 119 which 
aligned the EPC with the provisions of the Biotech Directive. The Council also provided 
that the Directive should be used as a supplementary means of interpreting the EPC. 120 As 
a result, the Recitals to the Directive can be taken into account where relevant121 in 
interpreting the EPC. Furthermore, rule 23b-e has been added to the Implementing 
Regulations of the EPC and provides that ‘Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions shall be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation.’122 For the converse situation – i.e. as to the influence of the EPC on 
Community legislation, the Directive states in Article 1(2), that the Directive shall be 
without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States pursuant to international 
agreements. Both the regulations of the EPC and the practice of EPO could therefore be 
relevant when interpreting the Directive and the implementations of EU Member States. 
 
                                                 
117 Article 10 provides a specific regulation in regard to the exhaustion of these patents, whilst Article 11 
establishes a rule of Farmers’ Rights, both of which can be seen as a special defences against infringement 
accusations. The latter allows farmers to use animal reproductive material for the purposes of pursuing their 
agricultural activities. See also sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2.  
118 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 318.  
119 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 319.  
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid.  
122 Paterson 2001, p. 13.  
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3 Exemptions from patentability of inventions regarding processes for 
the production of farm animals  
3.1 Introduction to the patentable subject-matter and the general requirements 
of patentability  
In order to grasp the scope of protection we must establish an understanding of the 
processes that are exempted from patentability, and the link between the two. The general 
principle is that patents shall be available for any invention – this means products or 
process in all fields of technology, provided that the invention is new, involves an inventive 
step, and is capable of industrial application.123 This principle (and obligation) is stated in 
TRIPS Agreement Article 27 as a general provision for the Member States of the WTO. 
The necessity for the presence of an invention can be considered in conjunction with the 
categories of excluded subject-matter.124 First of all this would imply that a discovery 
cannot be subject to patent protection. Furthermore, most patent legislation provides a non-
exhaustive list of things not regarded as inventions.125 Finally there are some restrictions on 
the subject-matter which exclude certain categories from patentability. These exemptions 
apply to immoral inventions or inventions deemed contrary to ‘ordre public’, as well as 
inventions regarding any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological process for 
the production of animals or plants. For the purpose of this thesis, the exemption regarding 
‘essentially biological processes’ is the most relevant, since it in many ways demarcates the 
                                                 
123  TRIPS Article 27, EPC Article 52(1) and the Norwegian Patents Act sections 1–2. See also Bently 
and Sherman 2001, p. 362, Paterson 2001, p. 404, Stenvik 2006, p. 29.  In addition to these general 
requirements, some theorists list a few internal requirements for patentability. These include: (1) the patent 
must disclose the invention in a manner that is clear and complete enough for it to be performed by persons 
skilled in the art (EPC Article 83), (2) the claims must be supported by the description (EPC Article 84), and 
(3) the patent must not be amended in such a way that it contains additional subject-matter, or extends the 
protection conferred by the patent (EPC art. 123(2)-(3)), cf. Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 457. As these can 
be regarded as requirements to the patent application and not patentability requirements for the inventions, 
they are less significant for this thesis and will not be further described.  
124 Paterson 2001, p 404.  
125 E.g. EPC Article 52(2)(3)  
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patentable subject-matter for inventions regarding process patents for animal breeding 
methods, thereby representing a demarcation of importance for the scope of the patent 
right.       
3.2 Exemption from patentability for essentially biological processes   
The general principle of patent law is that any invention can be subject to patent 
protection.126 Nonetheless, the TRIPS agreement allows Member States to exclude certain 
subject-matter from patentability. In the area of biotechnology, patent protection can be 
granted for all inventions except ‘plant and animal varieties essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals’.127 In the following, an analysis of the latter 
exemption is presented.128  
 
The point of departure in the TRIPS Agreement is that Article. 27.3 (b) opens for members 
to exclude from patentability 
 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes.’ (Emphasis added)  
 
The scope of this exemption from patentability must be established through an 
interpretation of the term ‘essentially biological process’, and the point of departure is the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms.129  According to the Oxford English dictionary, 
‘essentially’ emphasizes the basic, fundamental or intrinsic nature of a person or thing, 
indicating that this quality is the most important one.130 To qualify for exemption in the 
case of essentially biological processes, the biological element should therefore be the most 
important quality of the invention in question. A natural linguistic interpretation would thus 
                                                 
126 TRIPS Article 27.  
127 See TRIPS Article 27.3 (b), EPC Article 53(b), EC Biotech Directive Article 4.1.  
128 For an in-depth analysis of the exemption regarding plant and animal varieties, see Bryde 2003.  
129 Cf. general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31. 
130 Compact Oxford English Dictionary 2005.   
 29
imply that the degree of a human element in the process is decisive for the invention not to 
be essentially biological. In other words, whether the technical human element can be 
considered a necessary part of the invention or has a sufficient impact on the result of the 
process. 
 
The exemption from patentability for essentially biological processes has been subject to 
interpretation in several cases in the EPO Boards of Appeal. Since the language of TRIPS 
Article 27.3(b) was inspired by the text of Article 53(b) of the EPC, it has been claimed 
that the jurisprudence of the EPO may be relevant for interpretation of the exemption in the 
TRIPS Agreement.131 Strictly speaking, according to the principles of international law, the 
EPC should not influence the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, since the provisions 
of the former concern only those European countries belonging to the EPO.132 
 
Whether a process is essentially biological will depend on the fundamental nature of the 
invention as it appears when the patent claims are interpreted. In the case T 320/87 (Hybrid 
plants/Lubrizol), the Technical Board of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a process 
(for the production of plants) is to be considered as ‘essentially biological’ within the 
meaning of Article 53(b) of the EPC. The Board stated that this would have to be 
 
 judged on the basis of the essence of the invention taking into account the totality of 
 human intervention and its impact on the result achieved.133 
   
The assessment seems therefore to revolve on the degree of human involvement in the 
process as well as its influence on the result achieved. However, the Board further 
emphasized that   
 
                                                 
131 de Carvalho 2005, p. 217.  
132 Cf. Vienna Convention Article 34.  
133 T 320/87 point 6.  
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the necessity of human intervention alone is not yet a sufficient criterion for its not being 
‘essentially biological’. Human interference may only mean that the process is not a ‘purely 
biological’ process, without contributing anything beyond a trivial level. 
 
This indicates a certain qualification of the human element in order for the invention not to 
be exempted. This specification was emphasized in the decision T 356/93 (Plant cells/Plant 
genetic system), where the Board stated that 
 
a process for the production of plants comprising at least one essential technical step, which 
cannot be carried out without human intervention and which has a decisive impact on the 
final result (…) does not fall under the exceptions to patentability under Article 53(b) 
EPC.134 (Emphasis added).  
 
A process should therefore not be excluded if a technical human intervention plays a 
significant role in determining or controlling the result:135 the assessment depends upon the 
degree of human involvement in the process. The word ‘essential’ is considered to refer to 
the quality, not the quantity, of human involvement136 It is not the amount of human or 
biological elements that are decisive, it is the effect of the technical element on the 
biological processes. A biological process can thus be a part of the invention as long as the 
technical elements are of the essence for the achieved result. The reason for this 
qualification of the human element seems to be that what is in principle essentially a 
biological process can, from a patent perspective, be regarded as having a certain technical 
character, thus qualifying in principle as an invention.137 Therefore, the assessment of the 
exclusion uses the notion of technical character in a slightly different meaning.138 Technical 
character here refers to a higher requirement of technicality than is required for the process 
to qualify as an invention. According to the interpretation of European case law, to meet 
                                                 
134 T 356/93, point 28.  
135 See also Goldbach 1997, p. 284.  
136 Dybdahl 1999, p. 56.  
137 Westerlund 2001, p. 405.  
138 Ibid.  
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the higher technical requirement it is necessary that there be at least one essential step with 
decisive impact for the end result.139 
 
The question remains as to what these provisions actually exempt, in practical terms. Just 
which processes for the production of farm animals are not patentable under the provisions 
of the TRIPS agreement and the EPC? In today’s modern agriculture, most breeding will 
involve some form of human involvement, so processes that are entirely natural would at 
least include animals mating without human assistance either on the farm or in the wild.  
The guidelines for examination of the EPC present some examples of essential biological 
processes. 
  
A method of crossing, inter-breeding, or selectively breeding, say, horses involving merely 
selecting for breeding and bringing together those animals having certain characteristics 
would be essentially biological and therefore un-patentable. On the other hand, a process of 
treating a plant or animal to improve its properties or yield or to promote or suppress its 
growth e.g. a method of pruning a tree, would not be essentially biological since although a 
biological process is involved the essence of the invention is technical; the same could 
apply to a method of treating a plant characterised by the application of a growth-
stimulating substance or radiation.140 (Emphasis added).   
 
These examples, together with the interpretation of the scope of the exemption according to 
the TRIPS agreement and the EPC, indicate that it is not permissible to patent processes 
such as an animal eating and growing, or the principle of an animal mating with another.141 
A certain human involvement in the breeding process, such as crossing or selective 
breeding, might also be excluded. However, beyond these examples it becomes harder to 
construct examples that would fall under the exemption, and thus be excluded from patent 
protection.142 
                                                 
139 Westerlund 2001, p. 406.  
140 http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/e/c_iv_3_4_2.htm (accessed 1 February 2007) 
141 Tvedt 2007a, p. 6 (forthcoming).  
142 Ibid.  
 32
 
In the EC Directive the exemption for essentially biological processes is further specified 
by the provisions in Article 2(2). Article 4 upholds the general exemption mentioned 
above, and in Article 2(2) it is clarified that for the purpose of the Directive. 
 
a process for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists 
entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection.’(Emphasis added).  
 
Article 4 uses the same term ‘essential biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals’. However, from the specification in Article 2 (2), when compared to the wording 
in the TRIPS Agreement, it appears as though the discretion left in the latter to specify the 
exemption is used to narrow it, rendering the scope of patentability broader. For 
patentability this definition seems more favourable, since for exclusion it implies that the 
process must in its entirety consist of natural phenomena.143 This provision is harmonized 
in the EPC by the provision in rule 23b (5). Compared to the provisions of TRIPS 
Agreement Article 27.3(b) and EPC Article 53(b), the provisions of the Biotech Directive 
and rule 23b (5) EPC exempt only processes that consist totally or completely of natural 
phenomena. This seem to imply a restriction on the exemption for European patents,144 
since what is an essentially biological process, in a literal understanding, does not 
necessarily consist of entirely natural phenomena.  
 
The extent of the exemption from patentability for ‘essentially biological processes’ has 
been dealt with in several decisions from the Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
                                                 
143 Westerlund 2001, p. 412.  
144 Ibid: ‘This definition brings the European practice closer to the U.S., which knows of no such exclusion.’ 
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Office.145 In the case T 0083/05 of 22 May 2007, the connection between the provision of 
53(b) EPC and the provisions of the Biotech Directive was addressed.146 It was stated that  
 
the wording of Article 2(2) of the Biotech Directive and rule 23b (5) in the EPC is, in the 
view of the board somewhat difficult to understand.147  
 
The Board of Appeal interpreted the exemption in light of the legislative history of the 
provisions.148 It was pointed out that the wording of EPC Article 53(b) is almost identical 
to the wording of Article 2(b) of the 1963 Strasbourg Convention on the Unification of 
Certain Points of Substantive Patent Law. The sole difference consists in that the latter 
provision is not a compulsory patentability exclusion: it merely provides the signatory 
states with the possibility of excluding the subject-matter mentioned therein from 
patentability in their national laws. Furthermore, Article 2(b) of the Strasbourg Convention 
excluded ‘purely biological processes’. The Board stated that the new text meant to specify 
that the processes which may be ‘ineligible for patents were essentially (and no longer 
purely) biological’.149 The exclusion should be extended to cover processes which were 
fundamentally of this type even if, as a secondary feature, ‘technical’ devices were 
involved (use of a particular type of instrument in a grafting process, or of a special 
greenhouse in growing a plant) – it being understood that such technical devices may 
perfectly well be patented themselves, but not the biological process in which they are 
used.150 The replacement of the narrower term ‘purely’ should imply that, according to the 
new wording, the exemption would have a broader scope than under the Strasbourg 
                                                 
145 E.g. T 0083/05  (2007), T 0356/93 (1995), T 0019/90 (1990), G 0001/98 – EBA (1999). 
146 The decision regarded a process for the production of plants, but the general statements on the 
interpretation could be of relevance since processes for the production of animals are exempted by the same 
provisions.  
147 Point 53.   
148 Points 38 to 42.  
149 Point 40.    
150 T 0083/05 p. 30-32.  
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Convention.151 The question remains as to whether the introduction of rule 23b (5) implies 
that the scope of the exemption due to harmonization with the Biotech Directive is further 
narrowed again. The Board considered  
 
that particularly when taking into account the adverb ‘entirely’, the wording of Rule 23b (5) 
EPC aims at a very narrow construction of the process exclusion contained in Article 
53(b).152 (Emphasis added) 
  
However, in its interpretation of the provisions of 23b (5) the Board of Appeal emphasized 
one ambiguity in the wording:    
 
[o]n the one hand, only processes which consist entirely of natural phenomena are 
considered to be essentially biological processes for the production of plants. On the other 
hand, crossing and selection are given as examples of natural phenomena. This appears to 
be self-contradictory to some extent since the systematic crossing and selection as carried 
out in traditional plant breeding would not occur in nature without the intervention of man. 
 
On the background of this, the Board interpreted Rule 23b (5) EPC as meaning  
 
that a process which, apart for ‘natural phenomena’ (which appear to cover crossing and 
selection by way of legal fiction), contains an additional feature of technical nature would 
be outside the ambit of the process exclusion.153  
 
In relation to the examples presented above, this should suggest that a process like 
crossing, inter-breeding or selective breeding would not be excluded if it contains an 
additional feature of a technical nature, even a small technical feature. One example might 
possibly be a technical feature for locating and determining the selection criteria in the 
genetic material of the animal. 
                                                 
151 Point 42.  
152 Point 54.  
153 Ibid.  
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In summary: the actual processes that fall outside the scope of patentable subject-matter 
appear to be relatively few. The EPO applies a very narrow construction of the process 
exclusion. Furthermore, it has been claimed in theory that it is a general principle in legal 
interpretation that an exemption from a general provision is to be construed in a narrow 
manner.154 For patent protection in the EPC, document IV/2071/61-E of the historical 
documentation of the EPC Working Party stated: ‘the concept of patentability in the 
European patent law must be as wide as possible’.155 This has led to the principle of 
interpretation stating that, for the reason of being an exemption, exclusion from 
patentability for essentially biological processes should be read in a restrictive manner.156 
Thus, the point of departure in interpreting and determining the scope of exemptions from 
patentability is, at least according to EPO practice, that it should be read in a restrictive 
manner which implies a narrow construction of permitted exclusions. This principle is 
specified for patent exemptions in the above-mentioned decision of the Board of Appeal, T 
0083/05 of 22 May 2007. The Board stated that Article 53(b) EPC represents an exception 
to the general principle of patentability as laid down in Article 52(1) EPC, and has to be 
interpreted narrowly.157 The result appears to be an exemption with a limited scope of 
applicability, interpreted narrowly on the basis of the choice of wording, and also in nature 
of its being an exemption to the general rule of patentability. The exemption seems 
therefore not to reduce the scope of patentability for the production of biological material 
to any great extent.    
 
With this in mind, we now need to look into the scope of protection for inventions that fall 
outside the remit of the exemption for ‘essentially biological’ processes.  
                                                 
154 Goldbach 1997, p. 40.  
155 Referred to in Goldbach 1997, p. 40.  
156 de Carvalho 2005, p. 218. 
157 Cf. ECJ C-377/98 Para (38), which states that Article 53(b), as an exception, must be narrowly construed; 
see also T 0019/90 (1990). 
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4 Scope of protection for process patents in farm animal production  
4.1 Introduction to the scope of patentees’ exclusive rights to inventions on 
processes 
A patent is a set of exclusive rights granted to the holder of the patent for a period of time. 
The set of rights conferred upon the patentee derives from the claims in the granted patent. 
The patent on a process protects the patentee’s rights by entitling him to prevent others 
from performing the process described in the patent. Additionally the patent protection 
confers exclusive rights, to some degree, to the product obtained by this process. The scope 
protection is determined by interpretation of the patent claims,158 where the point of 
departure is the wording of the claims, supplemented by the descriptions and drawings.159 
The description and claims, ‘respectively, disclose the invention in a usable form, and 
demarcate the scope of the monopoly.’160 The drawings provide a representation of the 
invention and may be used to interpret the claims.161  
 
Because of the international character of the patent law, and the globalization of trade, 
conventions have been established aimed at harmonizing the scope of protection and 
establishing minimum levels of protection world wide.162 When such agreements or 
conventions are established, they normally draw up general regulations for protecting 
patents in all fields of technology. The implications of the implementation in specific 
national legislation might differ, depending on the field of science to which the regulations 
are applied. The following will therefore address the general rules of patent law applied to 
one specific area of technology – farm animal breeding – and analyse the particular 
considerations this might create.  
 
                                                 
158 Stenvik 2006 p. 362. 
159 Cf. EPC Article 69(1).  
160 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 332.  
161 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 339.  
162 See chapter 2.  
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The most obvious difference regarding process patents in farm animal breeding is the 
protected material’s ability to ‘re-invent’ itself through self-reproduction. This implies that 
the scope of protection on the forthcoming generations is more difficult to establish. Using 
a patented process might give the patent-holder a legal position in relation to the offspring 
from the application of the process.163 To establish the scope of protection one must 
determine for how many generations this applies, within the 20 year period of 
exclusiveness. Also, to what degree the legal position of the patent-holder applies to 
offspring subject to alterations outside of the described patented process. Another relevant 
issue regards the fact that these ‘products’ might not require the use of the patented process 
to self-replicate; and interpretational difficulties could occur regarding whether these 
products can be said to be ‘obtained directly’164 by the process.  
 
Appling patent law to processes for the production of animals could also have certain 
implications regarding traditional property. The issue has been raised of whether the scope 
of protection might lead to changes not only in intellectual property rights, but also in more 
traditional property rights of the owners of the animals. 165 It has been argued that, given 
the unique characteristics of biological inventions, granting the patent holder exclusive 
rights that extend not only to the particular organism embodying the invention, but also to 
all subsequent progeny of that organism, represents a significant increase in the scope of 
rights offered to patent holders.166 It has also been argued that this represents a greater 
transfer of economic interests from the agricultural community to the biotechnology 
industry than exists in other fields of science.167 The indirect product protection might 
create a situation with complex rights concerning the offspring, as the owner of the animals 
already has a right to his animals and the patent-holder has the right to prevent ‘using, 
                                                 
163 Tvedt 2007a, p. 18 (forthcoming).  
164 Cf. TRIPS Agreement Article 28.1 (b).  
165 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2002, p. 12.  
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid.  
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offering for sale or selling’ the product from the application of the process.168 One part of 
the questions at hand is to what degree is the use of an animal, generations after the 
patented process has been applied, is restricted by the scope of protection conferred on the 
owner of the patent.  
 
For inventions in most other fields of technology, the patentee’s exclusive right as 
manifested in a patent claim ends at the first sale of patented goods.169 The patented 
process remains the exclusive right of the patentee, but the rights to the product obtained 
through the process are exhausted by the first sale. For processes for the production of farm 
animals, the product itself has the capability to self-reproduce. If exhaustion occurs with 
the first sale of the product the right of the patentee could be eroded, if such exhaustion 
would imply that the user could now freely exploit the product for breeding purposes. This 
balance between patentees’ rights to protect their inventions and farmers’ rights to exploit 
their property, represented by the animals and flocks, will be addressed in the following, by 
analysing the degree to which a patentee may restrict the use of the product obtained by the 
patented process.  
 
To a certain extent, Directive 98/44/EC seeks to compensate for some of the above 
mentioned differences, by more closely defining the patent protection for biotechnological 
inventions. The point of departure is, however, that the scope of protection granted for such 
inventions should be analogous to the protection of other technical inventions.170 The 
question then becomes whether the character of these inventions might involve different 
implications that affect the scope of protection. In the annulment proceedings, the 
Netherlands actually argued that applying patent law to biotechnological inventions created 
a specific right, even a new intellectual property right, so that the Directive could not be 
said simply to ‘harmonize’ the national principles of patent law.171 The argument was 
                                                 
168 Tvedt 2007a, p. 18 (forthcoming).  
169 Osborne 2004, p. 646.  
170 Recital 46.  
171 C-377/98 section 66.  
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based on the assertion that a patent for biotechnological invention is a patent on life. 
Biological matter, in particular living animals or plants, could not be compared to non-
living matter, which until recently was all that could be patented.172 The fact that biological 
matter could reproduce without human intervention would make protecting it by patents 
different in kind from protecting dead matter.173 The argument was dismissed on the basis 
that patents on life were in fact not new phenomena,174 but the argumentation about the 
difference compared to traditional inventions could be relevant to the scope of protection 
for these patents. One reason for raising this issue could be found from a patent-theory 
perspective. One central concern in upholding the patent system, given its aim to promote 
technological development for benefit of society, is the balance between inventors and third 
parties.175 As long as the inventor receives protection for his contribution, the incentive to 
innovation through the economic reward of patents will remain intact.176 This in turn 
implies that protection beyond this would be unbalanced, but also that if protection were 
more narrow, that could lessen the incentive effect or encourage individuals or 
organizations not to disclose information about the inventions.177 This issue was debated in 
the preliminary stages of applying patent law to biotechnological patents, and measures178 
were taken to make protection analogous to other technical fields. These measures will also 
be addressed in the following as they to a certain degree influence the exclusive right of the 
patent-holder.  
 
The scope of protection to be established for process patents in the patent practice will 
eventually determine whether applying patent law to processes for the production of 
biological material will effect the correlation of intellectual property rights and more 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid.  
174 C-377/98 sections 68-70. 
175 Westerlund 2001, p. 77, Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 314.  
176 Westerlund 2001, p. 77 
177 Bently and, Sherman 2001 p. 314.  
178 Biotech Directive Articles 10 and 11 and e.g. the pre-emptive measures addressed in the Norwegian 
implementation, see St. prp. Nr. 43 (2002-2003) chapter 7.  
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traditional property rights, by restricting the use of farmers’ and breeders’animals. This 
chapter will analyse the relevant sources of law of that would form the basis of 
development for this patent practice.  
4.2 Scope of protection under the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement specifies detailed requirements for the legislation of the Member 
States, with effective measures to ensure fulfilment.179 As a result, TRIPS Member States 
are no longer allowed national discretion in intellectual property rights, or at least not 
without relinquishing their access to foreign markets and international co-operation.180  
 
The Preamble and the title of the Agreement refer to the trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property. The Agreement is to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.181 However some 
analysts argued the TRIPS negotiations were not about freeing trade, but about changing 
domestic regulatory and legal regimes, and that virtually all dimensions of intellectual 
property rights are caught be the Agreements provisions.182  
 
Of most interest for chapter 4 is Article 28.1 (b), which seeks to confer process-patent 
protection by ensuring a minimum scope of protection to the patented process and the 
product thereof. The term ‘minimum scope of protection’ implies that Member States are 
obliged to ensure at least this level of protection, but may also establish a broader scope of 
protection. The minimum level of protection conferred through the TRIPS Agreement has, 
however, been characterized to be fairly high and comprehensive.183 Article 28.1 (b) 
specifies: 
  
                                                 
179 Stenvik 2006, p. 36–38. 
 180 Ibid. 
181 TRIPS Agreement Preamble.  
182 Correa 2007, pp. 3–7. 
183 de Carvalho 2005, p. 28, Stenvik 2006, p. 36. 
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where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from the act of using (…) 
1. the process and,  
2. the product obtained directly by that process. (Emphasis and numbering 
added) 
 
This implies that the patentee has exclusive rights over the process as it is described and 
interpreted in the claims. Exclusive rights extend to products which are a direct result of the 
patented process. This so-called ‘indirect product protection’ covers products obtained by 
processes in any field of technology. The Agreement does not, however, specify the extent 
of protection in cases where the material is capable of self-reproduction. The factual 
breadth of the claims is the subject-matter protected against, i.e. what is actually 
enforceable in an infringement suit.184 The actual extent of granted claims is in fact not 
decided until an alleged infringement arises.185 For patent-holders and third parties alike it 
is therefore vital to know as exactly as possible the extent of the exclusive right. The 
following will interpret the provision relevant to determine the scope of protection for 
processes for the production of farm animals and to the offspring from the application of 
the process.  
 
Beyond the scope of protection Article 28.1 (b) specifies acts which the patent-holder 
entitled to perform in order to prevent others from performing as regards the process and 
the product derived from this. They include: 
 
(…) act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
184 Westerlund 2001, p. 180. 
185 Ibid. 
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Our first question thus concerns the extent of the patent: what can be said to fall within the 
protected process and the product thereof? Secondly, what forms of use may the patentee 
deny others from performing in regard to this process, and to what extent can the patent-
holder restrict the use of the reproduced material? The latter will be addressed in section 
4.4.  
4.2.1 Scope of protection for the process for production of farm animals  
Process claims may be drafted for various kinds of processes – for example, for processes 
applying chemical synthesis, genetic engineering (construction using cloned DNAs or 
preparation of mRNA and subsequently cDNA), isolation from a micro-organism or a 
combination of any of the above.186 Once the biological material has been isolated, claims 
can be drafted for processes that apply the material in breeding methods and schemes to 
utilize the biological material in the production of a herd. This presupposes that the general 
requirements of patentability are fulfilled and that the process is not exempted from 
patentability, cf. chapter 3.  
 
The scope of protection is, as mentioned, determined by an interpretation of the patent 
claims. Patent claims are the inventor’s own description of what is sought protected by the 
invention.187 Their function is thus to set out the scope of the legal protection conferred by 
the patent.188 The exclusive right of the patent-holder vis-à-vis the described process would 
thus extend to the subject-matter established through an interpretation of the claim(s), 
where any use of the process described in the claims are covered by the exclusive right. In 
this interpretation the exclusiveness includes the literal understanding of the process, and 
also to some degree further than the literal understanding.  
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187 Stenvik 2006, p. 362.  
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Patents will often include several claims, each of which confers an exclusive right upon the 
owner.189 The system is therefore that each patent claim forms an independent subject-
matter for an exclusive right. A claim might include several steps for the completion of the 
process. If a similar process does not fall within the direct interpretation of one of the 
claims, it might still be considered as infringing the patent. If it were so that a process 
would not be deemed to constitute an infringement merely by involving the replacement of 
only a small part of the claim, that could undermine the system of patent law.190 The 
assessment must ascertain whether the similarity, despite the description, is evident enough 
for it to be an infringement. If the similarity is found to be present, even if one or more of 
the described steps have been left out or replaced, an equivalent use of the patent has 
occurred.191 The rules of claim interpretation, hereunder the doctrine of equivalence will be 
further addressed in section 5.1. The reason for mentioning it here is to point out that 
processes that does not fall within the strict literal meaning of the claims, to some extent is 
covered by the exclusive right of the patent-holder.  
4.2.2 Scope of protection for the product obtained through the patented 
process – indirect product protection  
The effect of TRIPS Agreement Article 28.1 (b) is, when the patented invention is a 
process, the scope of protection includes the product achieved as the result of that process. 
This exclusive right has long been accepted,192 and is often explained by reference to the 
fact that the exclusive right could be undermined if protection were to extend only to the 
process itself.193  This protection is particularly important where no claim has been made to 
                                                 
189 This presupposes that the claims are independent claims. ‘A statement in an independent claim describes 
the invention and can stand separately, while a statement in a dependent claim has to be read in conjunction 
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316–322. 
190 Stenvik 2006, p. 363.  
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193 Stenvik 2006, p. 324.  
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a related product as such. It is also important where the process is implemented outside the 
country of origin for the patent, and the product from that process is imported there.194 The 
exclusive right to the patent concerns, due to the principle of territoriality, utilization of the 
process in the country where the patent is granted. The process can thus be utilized in other 
countries where the applicant for some reason has not received an exclusive right. The 
protection conferred on a patented process does not itself entitle a patentee to deny others 
the right to import from another country the product obtained by the process. An import 
possibility of this kind would, however, imply a substantial deterioration of the value of 
process patents. Conferring exclusive rights to the product obtained is an attempt to 
counteract this.195  
 
The indirect product protection extends the protection of process patents to include 
products produced through the application of the patented process, whether the production 
has occurred in the country the patent is granted or elsewhere.196 The interesting question is 
exactly how far-reaching this protection is. In other words, which products fall within the 
exclusiveness? For animal breeding methods, this becomes a question of for how many 
future generations the exclusiveness extends. Furthermore how extensive can the 
alterations of the offspring be, through cross-breeding and selection with other animals, and 
still be under the exclusive right. A relevant question in the extension of this: what acts of 
use of these generations are restricted without the consent of the holder of the exclusive 
right? The last question, regarding the use of the produced animals, will be addressed in 
section 4.4.  
 
The point of departure for the determination of these question is the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
the terms of the treaty.197 TRIPS Article 28.1 (b) protects the products ‘obtained directly’ 
by the patented process. A literal interpretation of the word ‘obtain directly’ indicates that 
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195 Stenvik 2006, p. 324. 
196 Ibid.  
197 The Vienna Convention Article 31. 
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the protection includes products achieved through the application of the described process. 
The term ‘directly’ suggest a qualification of the products protected.  
 
The wording of Article 28.1 (b) does not specify for how many generations to which the 
exclusive right will extend, but after the expiration of the patent, the patent-holder will not 
in any matter have exclusive rights to the patent. Furthermore, the wording does not 
specify, beyond the expression ‘obtained directly’ the extent of the exclusive right to the 
offspring. It has, however, been argued that the protection for process patents is potentially 
very wide:   
 
In part this is because where a range of different products flow from a single process, all of the 
products fall within the remit of the patent. It is also because the scope of protection not only 
concludes the products that flow from the process, but also the products that are based upon the 
products that flow from the process: if you like, the derivatives of the derivative.198 (Emphasis 
added).  
 
The assumption regarding the derivatives of the derivative does not follow directly from 
TRIPS Article 28.1 (b), which only confers rights to the products that flow from the 
process. The TRIPS Agreement is, however, a minimum standards agreement. The 
protection standard of the TRIPS Agreement shall cover any invention in all fields of 
technology and offer an adequate scope of protection.199 If this shall apply for process 
patents on farm animal breeding it could suggest that the protection extends also to the 
‘derivatives of the derivative’. Otherwise the protection could be undermined before the 
20-year period, and the protection might not be considered adequate according to the 
standards of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The protection extends to all of the products fall within the remit of the patent. However, to 
ensure that the scope of monopoly is kept within justifiable limits, an important restriction 
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is placed on the products that are protectable by process patents.200 There must be a 
qualified connection or relationship between the patented process and the product thereof. 
In TRIPS Article 28.1 (b), this link is ensured by the words ‘the product obtained directly 
by’ that process. According to patent theory, the product must have obtained its substantial 
qualities through the use of the patented process.201 Furthermore the product must not have 
lost its characteristics by further development.202 This specification gives rise to interesting 
questions as to the breeding of farm animals. If the protected ‘product’ is cross-bred with a 
specimen that does not at all possess the characteristics described in the patent claims, or 
possesses only some of them, has the ‘product’ then been ‘further developed’? The 
assessment seems to concern whether the animal has lost its essential characteristics due to 
the alteration, more precisely the essential characteristics protected and described in the 
patent claims. For each individual case of infringement there must be a separate and 
specific evaluation of how essential the process is for the product evaluated. For the 
question raised above this should suggest that protection could extend to the offspring of a 
indirectly protected ‘product’ and a unrestricted animal only if the progeny possesses the 
essential qualities as these are expressed in the patent claims. The question remains as to 
whether this applies regardless of whether the patented process has been used to obtain the 
product. In other words, does the exclusive right extend to all future generations that can be 
said to possess the same characteristics, or does the exclusiveness require that the offspring 
was in fact produced by the patented breeding method? The term ‘obtained directly by that 
process’ seem to imply that the patented breeding method must have been utilized in order 
for the paten-holder to acquire exclusiveness over the offspring. On the other hand, the 
reference to ‘at least the product obtained directly’ in Article 28.1(b), could indicate that 
Member States may extend the protection conferred under process patents to products not 
directly obtained by the claimed process.203 However, it has been argued that the provision 
                                                 
200 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 493.  
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‘does not mandate Members to go beyond what it provides for and doing so would 
dangerously blur the line differentiating process from product patents.’204  
 
The extension of the protection applies regardless of whether the product is produced in the 
country where patent protection is granted or whether it has another origin. The term 
‘directly obtained’ implies, however, that the provision does not protect against identical or 
similar products produced by other methods.205 ‘If an infringement is invoked, courts will 
normally determine whether the alternative process can be deemed ‘equivalent or not’.206 
The relevant assessment when determining if one process breaches an existing patent must 
therefore involve evaluating whether the product can be assumed to have been made by 
means of the patented process. It can be difficult for a patent-holder to prove that the 
product in question has been produced by the patented process. This has led to a reversal of 
the burden of proof in Article 34 of the TRIPS Agreement: in case of infringement dispute, 
in some situations the burden of proof is to be shifted to the alleged infringer. The 
interpretation of TRIPS Article 34 and its implications regarding process patents for the 
production of farm animals will be addressed in section 4.6  
 
An interpretation of TRIPS Article 28.1 (b) could suggest that the scope of protection for 
processes on farm animal breeding methods to some extent appears unclear. In particular 
this relates to the scope of the exclusive right to the product obtained by applying the 
process, and to the offspring of these ‘products’. Some of these uncertainties have been 
addressed in the EC Biotech Directive, and the following section will interpret the relevant 
provisions regarding the scope of protection for process patents on farm animal production.   
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4.3 Scope of protection under European patent law  
4.3.1 European Patent Convention 
The European Patent Convention is principally concerned with the granting of patents 
rather than the scope of protection conferred.207 When EPC was drafted it was decided that 
questions about the infringement of patents issued by the EPO were better dealt with by 
national courts.208 Nonetheless, the close relationship between the validity and 
infringement has meant that decisions at the EPO have had impact on national law 
regarding infringement.209 The provisions and case law of the EPO could therefore be of 
relevance for the national courts when they establish the scope of protection of a process 
patent for animal production in an infringement proceeding.  
 
Article 64(3) states that ‘any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by 
national law.’ The only guidance given as to the scope of protection is found in the 
provisions of Articles 64 and 69, and the Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69.210 
According to Article 64(2), the protection conferred by a patent whose subject-matter is a 
process shall extend to the products obtained directly through that process. ‘The object of 
Article 64(2) and its national implementations is to confer a fair scope of protection to a 
patented process.’211 The effect of Article 64(2) is essentially that the sale and use of 
products made directly by utilizing a process that is the subject of a European patent 
constitutes infringement of that patent, as well as the use of the process itself; and the rights 
of a European patent must be construed accordingly.212 Consequently a European patent-
holder must also be considered as having rights as regards the import of such products into 
designated Contracting States.213 However, for this provision, as for the similar regulation 
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in Article 28.1 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement, extension of this protection is not specifically 
directed towards biotechnological inventions or their progeny. It simply states that 
protection extends to the products ‘directly’ obtained by the patented process, regardless of 
whether such products themselves are patentable.214 Furthermore, the EPC represents a 
harmonization of the scope of protection through the wording of the provisions, the 
interpretation and use, however, is carried out by the national courts and might be practised 
dissimilarly.    
 
It has been argued that restricting the scope of protection to products which are the ‘direct’ 
result of the patented biotechnological process does not provide fair or adequate protection 
for the patent-holder.215 Moreover, there might be uncertainty regarding use of a patented 
process for the production of self-replicating material, since the use of the patented process 
might not be necessary for self-replication.216 Whether fair or adequate protection is 
provided will depend on how the word ‘direct’ is interpreted. In straightforward cases 
where the subject-matter of an alleged infringement is the immediate end-product of the 
process, few difficulties arise.217 ‘The product obtained by the means of the patented 
process was the product with which the process ended.’218 However, if the immediate end-
product of a patented process is subject to further processing, the product of such further 
processing may also infringe the patented process if there is no ‘loss of identity’.219 The 
relevant interpretation factor in a European perspective seems therefore to be the ‘loss of 
identity’ test,220 which means whether the product obtained, subject to further processing, 
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retained its essential characteristics.221 Regarding processes for the production of farm 
animal genetic material the question is whether replicating the invention without using the 
patented breeding scheme would imply that product ‘loses’ its identity.  
 
This test was seemingly construed for traditional technical inventions, and the above- 
mentioned case law concerns inventions of a non-biotechnological character. The question 
remains whether the specific character of biotechnological process patents requires 
different evaluation, and how courts will apply this.222 
 
The scope of protection is, as mentioned, not of direct concern for the EPC. The extension 
of protection and claim interpretation are seen as belonging to the purview of national 
courts and legislators, whereas claim breadth is initially a matter for the Patent Offices, in 
this case the EPO.223 The Technical Board of Appeal did, however, address the issue of 
scope of protection in the Biotech Directive compared to the provisions of Article 64(2) 
EPC. In subsection 87 the Board of Appeal states that:  
 
On the coming into force of the proposed EU directive, its Chapter II (Articles 8 to 11) 
would appear to require the national laws of EU member states to be revised, as this 
Chapter II seems to give far more extensive rights than Article 64(2) EPC, while at the 
same time introducing new possibilities for obtaining compulsory licences. But the Board 
considers that, like Article 64(2) EPC, these articles would be a matter purely for courts 
considering infringement and the relevant licensing authorities, and are not to be taken into 
account when a patent office considers compliance with the provisions of Articles 52 to 57 
and 83 EPC, or national equivalents.224 (Emphasis added) 
 
The Board of Appeal appears to be of the opinion that the Biotech Directive does confer far 
more extensive rights to the owner of a patent on the process for the production of 
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biological material. As the wording of EPC Article 64(2) is basically identical to Article 
28.1 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement, the argument could also apply to the level of protection 
conferred through the TRIPS Agreement. In other words the rights conferred through the 
provisions of the EC Biotech Directive seem more extensive than the protection discussed 
in section 4.2 above. The perspective of the EPO Board of Appeal in case T 1054/96 could 
be relevant for the following, when the scope of protection will be addressed on the basis of 
an interpretation of the EC Biotech Directive.  
4.3.2 The EC Biotech Directive  
The Directive requires EU/EEA Member States to protect all but the exempted 
biotechnological inventions under national patent law. Basically, the level of protection 
shall be the same as for inventions.225 To achieve this, Articles 8 and 9 specify the scope of 
protection for biotechnological inventions. Furthermore Articles 10 and 11 provide new 
defences against infringement of the rights concerning biotechnological inventions.226 As 
explained above, the scope of protection is determined by an interpretation of the patent 
claims (see also section 5.1 below). Within the framework of the interpretation, the rights 
conferred to the patent-holder are regulated in national-level legislation and are required to 
be equal, so that the legislation of the Member States is to be in accordance with the 
Directive.227 The Biotech Directive does not specify which actions are subject to the 
control of the patent-holder,228 thus making this a matter for national discretion within the 
framework of the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement.229 
 
With this Directive, the European Union established certain special regulations regarding 
biotechnological inventions. However, by allowing patents on biotechnological inventions, 
the Biotech Directive also imposes patent law in general on an area of technology that 
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differs from other areas. This had already been accomplished with the TRIPS Agreement’s 
obligation to grant patents in all areas, but the Biotech Directive provides further 
specification. The Preamble notes that there was a need for clarification of the scope of 
protection regarding biological material (due inter alia to the ability of such material to 
self-reproduce).230 First of all, differences in national legislation were seen as something 
that might create trade barriers and impede the functioning of the internal market.231 The 
problem could grow if the Member States adopted new and different legislation and if 
national case-law interpreting such legislation developed differently.232 Implementation of 
the Biotech Directive did not, however, according to the Preamble, necessitate the creation 
of a separate body of law in place of the rules of national patent law.  
 
The European Parliament used the room for manoeuvre under the TRIPS Agreement to 
further specify the scope of protection for progeny of material obtained through a patented 
process. The scope of protection covering the product obtained directly through the 
patented process in the TRIPS Agreement Article 28.1 (b) includes in the Biotech Directive 
also ‘any other biological material derived from the directly obtained material’. This 
implies that the patent confers a certain degree of protection on the progeny and other 
biological material derived by the obtained material. The uncertainty about exclusive rights 
to future generations of the product of a patented process is thus to some degree 
specifically addressed.  
 
The Preamble (in Recital 12) states that the TRIPS Agreement, which has been signed by 
the European Community and the Member States, provides that patent protection must be 
guaranteed for products and processes in all areas of technology. The Biotech Directive 
could thus be seen as the means by which the European Union intended to employ the 
flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement to specify obligations regarding biotechnological 
inventions. The question is then what this fulfilment implies, through an interpretation of 
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the provisions in the Directive, regarding the scope of protection of process patents on 
methods for breeding farm animals. According to the principles of EC law, all Member 
States must apply the level of protection that the Biotech Directive provides 
Article 8(2) of the Biotech Directive states: 
 
The protection conferred by a patent on a process that enables a biological material to be 
produced possessing specific characteristics as a result of the invention shall:  
 
1.  extend to biological material directly obtained through that process and to,  
2.  any other biological material derived from the directly obtained biological material 
through propagation or multiplication in an identical or divergent form and possessing 
those same characteristics. (Numbering and emphasis added) 
 
The Biotech Directive states that, in addition to the process itself, the scope of protection 
extends also to material ‘directly obtained’ by the process. In this part of the wording, the 
protection is practically identical to that of the TRIPS Agreement, and does not differ in 
scope from what was discussed in section 4.2. This part of Article 8(2) establishes the 
scope of protection for the first generation of an applied breeding method. The logical next 
step would then be to interpret the extent of protection conferred to subsequent generations 
of this animal. Article 8(2) states that the scope of protection includes ‘any other biological 
material’ obtained through multiplication of this material. This goes further than Article 
64(2) of the EPC and its national equivalents, as the protection conferred upon a claim to a 
process for the production of a biological material extends beyond the biological material 
obtained directly through the claimed process, and covers also the biological material 
‘derived from the directly obtained biological material which possesses the same 
characteristics’.233  Correspondingly, protection under Article 8(2) extends further than that 
provided under TRIPS agreement Article 28.1 (b), or at least according to what can be read 
directly in the wording of Article 28.1 (b). The patent-holder is granted exclusive rights to 
commercial exploitation of the process, to the animals ‘directly’ produced by this process, 
and moreover to their offspring.  
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The Biotech Directive thus offers more extensive protection for process patents. The 
following will analyse the details of this extension to establish the possible implications for 
process patents on farm animal breeding methods.  
 
The first interpretational question refers to what subject-matter is covered by the scope of 
protection. According to Article 8(2), protection extends to any material ‘derived’ from the 
biological material. First of all this seems to imply that it is not only the product of the 
process which is protected. For processes in farm animal breeding, the product would be an 
animal, as would any material derived from the process. The term ‘any’ thus seem to 
indicate that the semen and embryos of the animals produced may is also under the 
exclusive right of the patent-holder.  
 
It is, however, required that the material has been ‘derived from the directly obtained 
biological material’. As noted by Kamstra et al., in a contextual interpretation, ‘the term 
‘derived’ is given a broad meaning through the use of the words ‘through propagation or 
multiplication in an identical or divergent form’.234 Legal certainty seems possible in 
relation to what is meant by ‘identical form’, but the Directive provides no guidance as to 
what is meant by ‘divergent form’.235 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, things 
that are ‘divergent’ are ‘very different, or opposing, in attitudes or characteristics’.236 For 
processes in farm animal breeding this could seem a rational solution as it would allow for 
natural genetic variation. On the other hand, the term ‘divergent’ could imply a protection 
that would cover almost any animals that had some connection to the applied process, even 
those with opposite or very different characteristics. 
 
It is not certain whether a court would apply this broad meaning of the term if an 
infringement case regarding the use of future generations of a ‘product’ produced by a 
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patented process were brought before them. In fact, the term is somewhat unclear. It limits 
protection to animals possessing the same characteristics; however, these may appear in a 
divergent form – and, according to normal English usage of the term, things that are 
‘divergent’ are different inter alia in their characteristics. 
 
The ambiguity regarding the interpretation of this term has been addressed in the patent 
literature. Kamstra et al.237 have noted some possible difficulties that the courts will have to 
address based on the regulations in Article 8.238 First of all, there is the question of whether 
implementation of Article 8 in the national legislation of Member States must extend 
protection to material that possesses characteristics of material defined by the claims of a 
patent which would otherwise not be covered by the claims. This question is further 
elaborated to whether the scope of protection should extend to ‘divergent’ biological 
material whose possession of the ‘specific characteristics’ would not be obvious or 
predictable from its derivation from the original material (possessing these ‘specific 
characteristics’) produced through the application of the invention.239 Kamstra et al. 
concludes that these questions are unfortunately not answered in the implementing texts so 
far seen in the Member States.240 This implies that the courts of the Member States will 
have to rely mostly on the wording of the Directive when establishing the scope of 
protection in an infringement case. According to the report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, COM(2005) 312 final, the wording of Article 8 
might be seen as arguing for a broad scope of protection rather than a restricted one.241 The 
courts will have to determine specifically, for each infringement proceeding, how to apply 
the term ‘divergent’. Since there is no case law directly relevant for the assessment, it is the 
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interpretation of Article 8(2) that will, for the most part, be decisive. Both the choice of 
terms and the report from the Commission (COM (2005) 312 final) indicate a broad scope 
of protection.  
 
A related question is how to determine, through interpretation of the wording of Article 
8(2), when the exclusive right is exhausted. For how many generations/multiplications will 
the patent confer exclusive rights to the patent-holder? The wording of Article 8(2) does 
not specify a number of generations for which the exclusive right will continue. However, a 
natural point of departure would be that, after the expiry date of the patent (normally 20 
years), the patent-holder will no longer have exclusive rights to the process nor the 
products obtained.242 The question remains as to how many propagations or multiplications 
the exclusiveness covers – and here it would seem to extend to all future multiplications 
within the period, as long as they possess the same characteristics as the biological material 
produced by the patented process. The term ‘obtained directly’ seems, however, to open for 
the question of whether the exclusiveness covers any subsequent material of the process 
regardless of whether the process was employed, or whether it is required that the patented 
breeding method must be used continually on the animals obtained, in order to attain 
exclusive rights to the offspring. Article 8(2) specifies that the protection offered shall 
extend to biological material directly obtained through that process. This is, however, 
specified only in relation to the first generation. For subsequent progeny and material this 
specification is not repeated, although it is required that the biological material is derived 
for the obtained material ‘through propagation or multiplication’. The term ‘propagation or 
multiplication’ could thus indicate that subsequent generations are protected regardless of 
whether that particular process was applied. The practical implications of this are difficult 
to foresee. It might, however, be that patent-holders maintain their exclusive rights to the 
animals regardless of how the offspring are multiplied by farmers.  
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In addition, the question of when the patent right is exhausted seems imply interpretational 
intricacy regarding the requirement of a qualified relationship between the product obtained 
and the ensuing progeny. How substantial must the differences be before an animal can no 
longer be said to possess the ‘same characteristics’? And would cross-breeding with an 
unpatented animal mean that the resultant progeny are no longer protected? A particularly 
complicated assessment would apply to future generations of the ‘product’ derived from 
the process if these have been altered. If the ‘products’ are used in a herd, cross-bred with 
other individuals not possessing the same characteristics, to what degree of protection are 
these individuals entitled? Considering that the exclusiveness could cover obtained material 
in a divergent form, the answers to these questions seem to depend on how the courts will 
interpret the term ‘possessing those same characteristics’. As a point of departure, this 
would be based upon how the characteristics the process is to improve are described in the 
patent claims. However, this seems also to imply assessments of a biological character. The 
courts will have to determine what the specific characteristics are biologically, compare 
these with the alleged infringing products, and then determine whether this animal has 
‘lost’ its identity243 or still possesses the specific qualities. When a breeding process is 
applied to improve e.g. certain health traits, the offspring of this process possessing those 
improved characteristics would appear to be under the exclusive right of the patent-holder. 
If the offspring is cross-bred with an animal not under the indirect product protection, but 
possessing similar desirable health traits, how can it be determined whether those specific 
characteristics originate from the patent-protected animals? The term ‘possessing those 
same characteristics’ could also pose difficulties regarding natural genetic variations in the 
animals. Even if the patented process is applied, natural genetic variations could appear in 
future generations.  
 
The previous interpretation of the Biotech Directive will in the following be evaluated in 
light of the general perspectives of the patent system and the evaluations indicated in the 
Preamble of the Directive. The rationale for the specification in Article 8(2) regarding the 
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scope of protection could be found in consideration for the rights of the patent-holder, and 
the value of this patent to the owner. When the material has the capability to ‘re-invent’ 
itself through self-reproduction, others could exploit the value of the invention by freely 
using the offspring. The patentee could then not have exclusive rights throughout the entire 
20-year period if the protection does not extend to all future generations. This argument 
was upheld by the European Court of Justice in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
the Annulment case C-377/98.244 In section 122 the Court stated that Article 8(2) ‘adapts a 
well-known principle of traditional patent law to the exigencies of biotechnological 
inventions.’245 This principle has been incorporated in international patent legislation since 
at least 1958.246 The rationale for this conferred right is given in section 121, where the 
Court states: ‘in the case of patented material capable of reproducing itself, the value of the 
patent would clearly be eroded if it did not extend to future generations of such 
material.’247 And in section 123 it is emphasized that, if the material obtained through a 
process ‘could be freely propagated by a purchaser, the value of a process patent would be 
nullified.’248 However, the long-established principle to which the Court refers to was 
implemented at a time when the potential importance of biotechnology could not have been 
predicted.249 It could therefore appear to have slightly different application for traditional 
inventions than for self-reproducing material. The principle is found in Article 5 quarter of 
the Paris Convention:  
 
when a product is imported into a country of the [Paris] Union [for international protection 
of industrial property] where there exists a patent protecting a process of manufacture of 
the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights, with regard to the imported product, 
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that are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of importation, on the basis of the 
process patent, with respect to products manufactured in that country.250 (Emphasis added.).  
 
Therefore, according to a literal interpretation, the principle seems to apply to rights only to 
the import of the ‘first’ product of the process for consumption. The specification in Article 
8(2) does, however, imply restrictions on the use of subsequent material of the ‘first’ 
product. The intention of the principle in the Paris Convention seems therefore to be of a 
slightly different nature. On the other hand, no restrictions on the future generations or on 
the biological material of the obtained product could enable reproduction of the product by 
multiplying it through breeding, or by selling the semen or embryos for that purpose. More 
generally, this issue relates to the balance between investment and potential reward for the 
patent-holder in a field, compared to subsequent innovators and users.251 However, 
economic evidence is hard to come by,252 and it is difficult to assess empirically to what 
degree the potential scope of protection in either direction would influence innovation and 
development. The ECJ seems to be of the opinion that protection of future generations is 
necessary to make biotechnological process patents effective. The interpretation made by 
the ECJ is based inter alia on the Preamble of the Biotech Directive, where Recital 46 
states that such extension of scope is necessary to ensure the reward to which the inventor 
is entitled for his efforts:  
 
in view of the fact that the function of a patent is to reward the inventor for his creative 
efforts by granting an exclusive but time-bound right (…) the holder of the patent should be 
entitled to prohibit the use of patented self-reproducing material in situations analogous to 
those where it would be permitted to prohibit the use of the patented, non-self-reproducing 
products. (Emphasis added.)  
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This same Recital does also specify how the protection on future generations is to be 
stipulated. The inventor should, according to the Preamble, be entitled to prohibit the use of 
the patented self-reproducing material to the same extent as for non-self-reproducing 
products. First of all this would imply that the protection conferred through the provisions 
of the Directive should not be more extensive than for other inventions. This, however, 
presupposes that the scope of protection for other inventions is of a measurable standard, 
and that this standard is comparable to the extent of protection for biological patents. 
Protection in situations analogous to the protection regarding non-self-reproducing 
products would, however, directly cover only the first ‘generation’. For non-biotechnical 
material, protection extends to the product obtained by the process. On the other hand, one 
could hardly imagine a non-biological product self-reproducing. The possibilities of 
circumventing the patent by utilizing the product obtained seem greater for living material, 
since the invention itself can be employed for duplication, if bred with another animal. 
Analogous protection with non-self-reproducing products thus seems not to be possible: 
either the protection is limited to the first-generation product (which opens for the 
possibility of reproducing the invention in future generations), or the protection is to some 
degree extended to derivatives of the first product (which would limit the use of the product 
beyond what an analogous protection would). The broader scope of protection of Article 
8(2) could be explained from these differences. On the other hand, the justification might 
not be equally evident for all stakeholders, as the Preamble clearly states that the patent-
holder should be entitled to prohibit the use of patented self-reproducing material in 
situations analogous to those situations where the patent-holder of a non-self-reproducing 
product could deny such application.  
 
The Preamble further emphasizes that it is of great importance for the economic 
development of the European Community to make conditions favourable for development 
in this sector.253 The economic incentive held to be created through the patent system was 
considered of high importance to the European Community,254 necessitating regulations to 
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ensure that such an incentive would emerge. On the other hand, the patent system is based 
on a balance between protection of the inventor’s commercial interest, and the interest of 
the public to freely exploit technological advances.255 This applies also to breeding 
methods on farm animals and the genetic material obtained by applying such methods. The 
paramount objective is to create technical innovation without unreasonably restricting the 
use of the invention by others.256 In the case of biotechnological inventions involving 
animal genetic resources, the users might be industrial-level breeders, but also farmers of 
varying scales and production capacities. If the level of the protection applied through the 
provisions of the Biotech Directive favours the patent-holder to a larger extent, by overly 
restricting the use of future generations, the balance is not maintained. On the other hand, 
much of the value of process patents on farm animal breeding methods lies in the 
exploitation of future improved generations. To uphold the balance between these 
conflicting interests may prove difficult, especially when the protected animals are part of 
the farmers’ herds, constantly evolving through continuous breeding.   
 
As seen in Recital 46 of the Preamble, the basis of comparison is the extent of protection 
for other non-biotechnical inventions. This implies that general patent law is relevant when 
establishing the scope of protection for self-reproducing material. However, it is less 
certain how the scope of protection for other inventions can offer interpretational value for 
self-reproducing inventions. The very fact that the inventions are self-reproducing implies a 
certain distinction. The Preamble does not indicate that inventors in the field of 
biotechnology are to be rewarded to a different extent: simply that the inventor shall be 
given an adequate reward considering his efforts and his contributions to the field. 
 
The question of an adequate scope of protection for these patents can be formulated in 
terms of whether it is more valuable to society to allow the patent-holder a broad scope of 
protection so that others who build upon this invention must seek a licence; or whether 
such patents should be limited in scope, so as to allow future uses of these patents to be 
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available for patent protection.257 The literal interpretation of Article 8(2) leaves 
uncertainty as to the scope of protection for process patents in farm animal breeding, and 
there is no case law to indicate whether the result of applying general patent law to living 
material de facto leads to a wider scope of protection for future generations of the inventive 
process, than in other fields of technology. The wording in the Biotech Directive Article 
8(2), however, seems to imply a fairly broad scope of protection. Furthermore, the 
Preamble is clear in its statements that the development of this field is important and 
necessitates sufficient protection of biotechnological inventions.258 As a result, Article 8(2) 
appears to oblige the national legislation of Member States to extend protection to material 
that would not otherwise be covered by the claims of the patent, since it includes material 
possessing the characteristics of the material derived from the obtained material in a 
divergent form. To some extent, the provisions of Article 5(3) seek to compensate for this. 
The Community legislators had intended at least to raise the possibility of a limited scope 
of protection covering only the specific industrial application identified in the patent.259 
Article 5(3) states that the industrial application must be disclosed in the patent application. 
However, this applies only to a sequence of a gene or a partial sequence of a gene. Article 
5(3) seemingly concerns only product patents, so some uncertainty remains as to the use of 
subsequent biological material of an applied breeding process.  
 
Although the wording of the Biotech Directive indicates a fairly broad scope of protection, 
other sources (e.g. considerations of the objective of patent law) could call for a more strict 
interpretation. In many ways, the commercial value of the result of the process derives 
from the natural characteristics of the original organism, and, it can be argued, has less to 
do with the invention as such. Furthermore the invention might involve improving species 
that have been developed through cross-breeding and natural selection for hundreds of 
years. The argument of adequate reward might therefore have less relevance for these 
inventions, since the patented process represents only the latest step in a continuous, long-
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established breeding process. Then again, to develop new and improved breeding methods 
might require high costs of research and development, and the general idea is that the 
patent system might help to recoup these costs. This is stressed inter alia in the Preamble, 
Recital 1-3: [t]he protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental 
importance for the Community’s industrial development;260  
 
[i]n the field of genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable 
amount of high risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them 
profitable;261 [e]ffective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is 
essential in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology.262 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The question remains as to what degree this ‘adequate legal protection’ (as provided 
through the Biotech Directive) to make investments in the field of biotechnology profitable, 
restricts the use of animals and subsequent generations.  
4.4 Acts of using that the inventor can prevent others from performing in regard 
to the patented process and the product obtained 
After establishing what processes and products from the application of the process fall 
within the exclusive right of the patent-holder, we need to ask what acts of use the patent-
holder can to deny others to perform regarding this subject-matter. The focus of sections 
4.2 – 4.3 on the scope of the processes or products subject to the exclusive right has now 
shifted to which activities the patent-holder can deny others to perform regarding this 
process or products.  
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The TRIPS Agreement lists the various elements that form the right to exclude others from 
exploiting the invention.263 ‘Patents accord the right to exclude, not to use. The right to use 
arises from economic freedom, not from the patent.’264  
 
Determining patent infringement can be separated into three tasks.265 First it is necessary to 
determine the types of activities that constitute an infringement. The following section will 
examine the types of activities that constitute an infringement of a process patent in farm 
animal breeding. Second, it must be ascertained whether the activity in question falls within 
the scope of the patented monopoly (sections 4.2 – 4.3.). In other words, the scope of the 
exclusive right to the process or the products obtained. Third, it needs to be determined 
whether the defendant is able to make use of any of the available defences to 
infringements. In connection with implementation of the Biotech Directive some specific 
defences were introduced for the infringement of biotechnological inventions. Section 4.5 
examines the defences relevant to the protection of process patents in farm animal 
breeding.  
 
Article 28.1 (b) specifies the acts that are subject to the control of the patent-holder in 
regarding a process patent to be: ‘act of using the process’ and the ‘using, offering for sale, 
selling or importing’ at least the products of the process. In other words, Article 28.1 (b) 
provides that a person infringes a process if he or she uses the patented process. 
Furthermore, infringement can occur if a person uses, sells, offers to sell or imports any 
product derived from that process.266 The Biotech Directive does not, as mentioned, specify 
which acts are subject to the control of the patent-holder,267 thus making this a matter for 
national discretion within the framework of the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement.   
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‘Act of using the process’ implies that the patent-holder can prevent third parties from 
performing the method described in the claims. If the use falls within the direct definition 
of the patent claims, an identical use has occurred. The assessment of whether the alleged 
infringing process implies an identical use of the patented process is a matter of an 
interpretation of the patent claims. If the use does not fall within the direct meaning of the 
claims, then one must assess whether it is sufficiently similar to constitute an 
infringement.268 The doctrine of equivalence implies that, if the alleged infringing process 
cannot be said to derive directly from the patent claims, such utilization might still be 
considered as an equivalent use of the patented process. 269 The doctrine of equivalence 
thus expands the patent protection beyond what the patent-holder described as his 
invention. If the similarity is sufficiently qualified, despite the replacement or exclusion of 
one or more elements, an equivalent use can be said to have occurred.270  
 
Given the territoriality of patent rights, as a general principle, process patents can be used 
to prevent third parties from using the patented process only in a country where the patent 
has been granted.271 The patent-holder cannot, however, as a point of departure, prevent the 
making and sale of the same product resulting from the patented process if it has been 
obtained through a different process.272 Nor can the patent-holder prevent the making and 
the sale if the patented process was applied in a different country.273 The TRIPS Agreement 
does, however, confer rights to products that are obtained by the patented process. This so-
called ‘indirect product protection’ extends the protection conferred on process patents to 
include products that are produced by application of the patented process, regardless of 
whether the process was executed in the country that granted the patent or elsewhere.274 
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The extension to at least the products obtained directly by the patented process thus confers 
a certain element of extraterritorial effect to the use of the process in a foreign 
jurisdiction.275 Article 28.1 (b) does not, however, cover cases where the product is 
obtainable by the patented process but evidence of the use of the patented process is not 
supplied.276 However, an obligation to provide such evidence can, at the discretion of the 
courts, be bestowed on the alleged infringer.277 Additionally, as addressed in section 4.3.2, 
the Biotech Directive specifies indirect product protection to include ‘any other biological 
material derived from the directly obtained biological material’. This implies that 
utilization of the products derived that are subject to the control of the patent-holder also 
covers the progeny of the obtained material, to the extent of the provisions of Biotech 
Directive 8(2).  
 
The right to deny permission for the ‘use’ of the product obtained would, according to the 
wording of Article 28.1 (b), imply that the patent-holder can prevent the further use of a 
product that was made by the patented process. For process patents in farm animal 
production this implies that the use of the first generations of an applied breeding process is 
restricted according to the process patent-holder’s rights. The exclusionary right does, as a 
point of departure, not extend to uses of the products marketed by the patent-holder, 
domestically or internationally, where this is subject to exhaustion of rights.278 Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement disclaims any intent to limit the Members’ freedom to regulate the 
issue of exhaustion of rights.279 The principle of ‘exhaustion of rights’ may be applied at 
the national, regional or international level. Applying the principle regionally would imply 
that exhaustion is deemed to have occurred if commercialization took place in a country 
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member to a regional agreement.280 The principle of exhaustion has been applied in the 
European Community, on the basis of jurisprudence elaborated by the ECJ, to avoid 
exercise of discriminatory policies by patent-holders within the Community.281 Under the 
doctrine of exhaustion, a patent-holder may not invoke the patent to prevent the further use 
of a product that has been placed on the market in the EU/EEA with the patentee’s 
consent.282 However, the doctrine of exhaustion leaves some uncertainty in regarding the 
use of produced animals for multiplication through breeding. The provisions of TRIPS 
Article 28.1 (b) apply to any technical field, and the exclusionary right does not extend to 
uses of the product marketed by the patent-holder where subject to exhaustion of rights. 
The extent to which the European doctrine of exhaustion of rights applies to material 
derived from the material placed in circulation by the patent-holder has not been addressed 
by any court.283 Kamstra et al. state that it is reasonably clear that the doctrine of 
exhaustion will apply to products obtained sold with the authority of the patent-holder 
within the EU/EEA.284 It is, however, not clear whether the doctrine applies to material 
derived from the ‘patent-exhausted’ material.285 In other words, whether the utilization of 
the products produced by the sold or licensed product is exhausted by the first sale. The 
agreed terms between the patent-holder and the purchaser/user could possibly stipulate 
terms of use of future generations, but in the absence of such a contractual regulation, the 
use would have to be determined by the doctrine of exhaustion. Since much of the value of 
a patent in farm animal breeding can be said to originate from the utilization of future 
generations of improved animals, the further use of the produced products could imply 
different assessments than in the case of traditional technical inventions. The patent-holder 
could be argued to have a need to uphold the exclusive right beyond the first sale or use of 
the protected process, since otherwise the protected invention might be reproduced simply 
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by breeding the animals. The point of departure is that the doctrine of exhaustion does not 
give the purchaser a right to produce new specimens of the product exhausted.286 Nor does 
the doctrine, as general principle, give the right to practice a patented process.287 The 
special characteristics of patents on breeding methods could imply that these general 
principles also come into effect on the material derived from the patent-exhausted material.  
 
Regarding the products obtained by the patented process, the patent-holder can also deny 
others the right to ‘offer for sale’ and ‘sell’ the products. ‘Offering for sale’ covers acts 
made with the intent of selling the product(s) obtained by the process.288 ‘Selling’ implies 
the right to prevent the sale and resale of infringing products, but it does not extend to 
resale of products first placed on the market by the patent owner.289 The right to deny sale 
or offering for sale also applies where the indirectly patent-protected product is sold to 
persons who intend to employ the product obtained for non-infringing activities, such as 
sale to someone who intends to use the product for experimental purposes.290  
 
The utilisation of the product in TRIPS Article 28.1 (b) is also restricted regarding the 
‘importing’ for the purpose of using, offering for sale, selling the animals produced by the 
patented process. In practice this implies that a patent-holder with exclusive rights to a 
process that produces animals with certain traits, could deny others from importing animals 
possessing the same characteristics. By implication this could restrict the individual 
farmers’ or breeders’ utilization of their animals beyond what traditional property rights 
implies. The breeders or farmers could not sell animals for the purpose of using the animals 
for breeding purposes, without the risk of the buyer infringing the exclusive right of the 
patent-holder or possibly themselves committing contributory infringement. 
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For processes on farm animal breeding methods Article 28.1 (b) implies that the patent-
holder can deny the use, sale and offering for sale or importing ‘at least’ the animals 
possessing obtained directly by that process. For process patents in farm animal breeding 
this would at least include the first generations of improved animals. When read together 
with the Biotech Directive Article 8(2), the right to deny applies to any other biological 
material possessing the same characteristics as the breeding method improves. This 
presupposes that evidence can be provided to establish that the patented process was used 
to produce the sold animals without the patent-holders consent.  
 
The interpretation of the extension to ‘at least’ the products obtained directly by the process 
in TRIPS Article 28.1 (b) has, according to Correa, raised several issues in the countries 
that have adopted this concept.291 First of all, difficulties could arise regarding the right to 
deny permission for utilization of the products obtained by the process in situations where 
these products are excluded from patentability. One example of this is the exemption for 
plant and animal varieties.292 Correa states that when a unique process of obtaining is 
known, the extension would be practically the same as for protection of the product as 
such, thereby de facto overriding the prohibition against patenting the product.293 Applied 
to the case of a process comprising a method for improving a herd, which is general in 
scope and is applicable to more than one specific breed or one ‘animal variety’, this could 
imply that the exemption for animals is practically without consequence.294  
 
Another uncertainty is whether the extension of the indirect product protection applies in 
cases where the product obtained by the patented process has been further processed. E.g. if 
the animals obtained have been bred with another animal of a different herd. According to 
the ‘loss of identity test’295 discussed above, the concept of ‘directly obtained’ applies in 
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cases where the directly obtained product has been further processed but has not lost its 
identity.296 If the purpose of the patented process is to produce animals with improved 
genetic traits to be used in the production of other animals,297 the use of the animal as a 
slaughter hog or for other purposes could imply that the product has lost its identity, and 
consequently fall outside the scope of protection. The patent-holder cannot refuse to allow 
the acts of use of these products.  
 
A more difficult assessment is when the patent-protected offspring is used for breeding 
purposes. The ‘act of using the process’ implies carrying out the activities described in the 
patent claim for the defined purpose.298 If the offspring of an applied process is used for 
breeding purposes outside the described methods of the patent (e.g. if the animal is bred 
with an animal from another herd or bred according to another breeding plan), there seems 
to be some uncertainty regarding what acts of use the patent-holder can deny others from 
performing regarding the produced animals. First of all: can the patent-holder deny the use 
of the progeny regardless of whether the animals were bred with animals of another herd?  
According to the Biotech Directive this seems to depend on whether the animals still 
possess the same characteristics as the directly obtained material. If another breeding plan 
is employed the question the courts would have to assess seems to be whether the bred 
animals can be said to derive directly from the obtained biological material.  
 
A related question is whether the act of crossing with other animals or using other methods 
is an equivalent use of the process. This seems to depend on how the patented process 
claims are formulated and how the doctrine of equivalence is applied on these acts of use. 
The use of a different animal in the same breeding process seems to draw near an 
equivalent use, at least if the animals obtained possesses the same characteristics as the 
animal obtained by the first employment of the patented process. The assessment of 
whether the use of the animals by means of other breeding methods is equivalent would 
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seem to depend on how different the other method is. Additionally the question remains as 
to whether such other propagation or multiplication could be considered equivalent use of 
the product obtained. The existing sources of law do not concretize the specific details to 
these questions. However, it has to some extent been specifically addressed in the Biotech 
Directive Article 10. The alleged infringer is given the option of presenting some specific 
defences regarding the use of the product obtained by the process. The right to exploit the 
offspring of a patented process and future generations must therefore be seen in connection 
with these defences. The following sections will analyse the provisions applied on process 
patents on methods for breeding farm animals.  
4.5 Special defences regarding infringement of biotechnological process patents 
as limitations to the exclusive rights  
Once the claimant has proved that the defendant has performed an activity that falls within 
the scope of the patent monopoly, the obligation shifts to the defendant, who must show 
that this activity is exempted from liability by one of the available defences to patent 
infringement.299 These defences could limit the scope of protection conferred to the patent-
holder in certain specific situations of ‘infringing use’ of the patent. Article 30 of the 
TRIPS Agreement allows members to:   
 
(…) provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interest of third parties. 
 
During the preliminary stages of preparing the EC Directive, one of the concerns raised 
was that patent protection of biological inventions would have a negative impact on 
farming practices.300 Here the legitimate interest of third parties was taken into account 
regarding normal exploitation and the interests of the holder of such patents. As part of the 
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regime dealing with biotechnological inventions, new defences to the infringement of 
patent or exceptions to the exclusive right for biotechnological inventions were therefore 
formulated.301 Acts that fall within the exemptions are not to constitute infringement, 
regardless of whether or not such acts would be considered infringements under Articles 8 
or 9 of the Biotech Directive.302  
4.5.1 Exhaustion of biological patents  
As discussed in section 4.3.2, Article 8(2) of the Directive requires Member States to 
extend the scope of protection to dealings with materials derived from the claimed material. 
Kamstra et al., however, argue that the doctrine of exhaustion of rights could dis-apply this 
extended scope of protection to some extent, since Articles 10 and 11 of the EC Directive 
specify limited circumstances in which the extension of scope of protection provided in 
Articles 8 and 9 is not to apply.303 According to Article 10:  
 
The protection referred to in Articles 8 and 9 shall not extend to biological material 
obtained from the propagation or multiplication of biological material placed on the market 
in the territory of a Member State by the holder of the patent or with his consent, where the 
multiplication or propagation necessarily results from the application for which the 
biological material was marketed, provided that the material obtained is not subsequently 
used for other propagation or multiplication. (Emphasis added).  
 
For the patent rights to be exhausted under Article 10, it is therefore necessary to establish 
that the multiplication or propagation that potentially infringes the patent is an incidence of 
what might be called the ‘true purpose’ of the sale.304 With animal breeding, it might be 
asked to what extent a patented breeding process sold or licensed in one Member State 
could restrict the further utilization of the animals derived from the process.  
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The extent of use of the product derived could be regulated in the contract between the 
patent-holder and the user. In such situations the exhaustion could thus be contractual; for 
other situations, Article 10 and 11 of the Directive specify limited circumstances in which 
the extension of scope of protection provided for in Article 8 is not to apply.  
 
Important here is the interpretation of the words ‘necessarily results’. As noted above, for 
the patent to be exhausted under Article 10, it must be established that the multiplication or 
propagation which potentially infringes the patent is an incident of the ‘true purpose’ of the 
sale. 305 An interpretation of the term ‘necessarily results’ would imply that the material 
obtained is not used for other types of propagation or multiplication. In the case of a 
breeding process for e.g. better meat quality, the user of the patent could apply the breeding 
method to his herd in order to improve the meat quality. The question is to what degree the 
result of the process (future generations of animals) can be utilized in the breeding scheme. 
According to Article 10, the ‘product’ could not be sold as a breeding animal, nor its semen 
sold to other farmers, since this is not the true purpose of the sale and such multiplication 
does not ‘necessarily result’ from the application for which the biological material was 
marketed, (the true purpose being: to apply the breeding method on the herd to improve the 
meat quality). Article 10 seem to imply that sales of the offspring as breeding animals or 
for other breeding purposes would not ‘necessarily’ result from the application of the 
invention, if the purpose of applying the process was to improve certain traits in the 
farmer’s herd. Article 10 would allow farmers to use the patented process, and sell the 
improved meat – but it would not be permitted to sell the derived animals of the process or 
their semen to other farmers, for the purpose of propagating new animals. In other words, 
this defence allows farmers to apply a patented process, breed the animals and sell the 
agricultural product – but not to sell the animals or semen to other farmers so that they in 
turn could propagate new animals.306  To what extent the product derived from the process 
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may be used for further breeding within the farmers herd is subject to the regulations of 
Article 11, the ‘Farmers’ Privilege’.  
4.5.2 ‘Farmers’ privilege’ 
The so-called ‘farmers’ privilege’ provides a limited exception to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent by allowing the individual farmer a certain use of the protected 
subject-matter that would not normally be possible without infringing the protected 
process.  
 
Article 11 (2) states that by 
 
[w]ay of derogation from Articles 8 and 9, the sale or any other form of commercialisation 
of breeding stock or other animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of the 
patent or with his consent implies authorisation for the farmer to use the protected livestock 
for an agricultural purpose. This includes making the animal or other animal reproductive 
material available for the purposes of pursuing his agricultural activity but not sale within 
the framework or for the purpose of a commercial reproduction activity. (Emphasis added).  
 
In essence, the exemption grants the farmers the right to use the propagating material for 
agricultural purposes but not to market it for breeding (commercial reproduction activity).   
As noted by Bently and Sherman: ‘In the debates surrounding the Biotechnological 
Directive, one of the fears raised was that patent production over biological inventions 
would have a negative impact on traditional farm practices. (…) In particular, it was feared 
that farmers would not be allowed to use the seeds that they harvested from their crops to 
re-sow crops, nor would they be permitted to breed patented animals.’307 The problem 
would appear to be that, in relation to a patent, the breeding processes carried out on farms 
might represent an infringement.   
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The protection conferred in Article 8 does not extend to plant-propagating material or 
breeding stock sold to a farmer by the patent-holder or with his consent, provided that the 
farmer uses the biological material or livestock for his own agricultural purposes.308 This is 
intended, inter alia, to prevent an increase in costs in agriculture because of inventions 
related to farm animals.309 The ‘farmers’ privilege’ of Article 11 makes an exemption from 
the exclusive right when the farmer uses the patented biological material for breeding 
livestock for his own agricultural use on the farm, but is limited regarding sales within the 
framework of or for the purpose of commercial reproduction activity. The basis for this 
exemption seems to lie in the need for to provide consistency and certainty for farmers, 
who should not face claims from patent-holders because (perhaps unknown to the farmer) 
these have product or process claims.310 The extent and the condition of the derogation 
provided in Article 11 (2) shall, however, be determined by national laws, regulations and 
practices.311 This in turn means that the consistency and certainty for farmers will depend 
on how the exemption is practised at the national level.  
 
The extent of this exemption seems to rely on a definition of the expression ‘pursuing his 
agricultural activity’. To draw the line between commercial breeding activity and the 
purposes of pursuing his agricultural activity could be difficult if the owner of the livestock 
engages in both types of activities. For example, is a one-off sale of the progeny of an 
applied breeding method a ‘sale within the framework of or for the purpose of a 
commercial reproduction activity’?312 Or does the term imply a more qualified activity then 
one-off sales – say, a breeding business? There are also differences among animal species 
that could make this assessment difficult. With some animals, breeding of hybrids and 
raising and keeping livestock are separate activities, while for others the two intertwine.313 
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The level of commercialization could also differ, from sector to sector, farmer to farmer 
and from country to country.   
 
According to Spranger, the farmers’ rights exemption is also problematic in relation to the 
TRIPS Agreement,314 as Article 34 imposes a reversal of the burden of proof, to the 
detriment of the farmer. As argued by Spranger, it is up to the farmer to prove that he did 
not violate the rights of the patent-holder – and, taking into account the possibility of self-
sowing (or here: self-breeding), the difficulty in proving innocence is evident.315 If 
Spranger’s interpretation of TRIPS Article 34 is accurate, the ‘burden’ of providing 
evidence that the ‘making of the animal or other animal reproductive material’ was done 
for the ‘purpose of pursuing his agricultural activity’, is bestowed on the alleged infringing 
farmer.   
4.6 Reversal of burden of proof for patents that cover processes for obtaining a 
product 
Generally the burden of proof is bestowed by law upon those who make an allegation. 
When it comes to patents for processes, however, it has been argued that it could be 
difficult for patent-holders to establish evidence of infringement, and consequently easy for 
infringers to conceal or disguise their wrongdoing.316 Since the TRIPS Agreement is a 
standard agreement for the protection of intellectual property, and one that includes patents 
in all fields of technology, here we must ask to what degree these difficulties also apply to 
process patents for the production of farm animal genetic material. Article 34 obliges the 
Member States to establish in their national laws that courts shall have the power to reverse 
the burden of proof.317 However, the courts are not obliged to do so: reversal of the burden 
of proof is in principle a matter of their discretion, dependent on the circumstances of each 
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case.318 Reversing the burden of proof imposes on the alleged infringer the obligation to 
provide negative proof. The alleged infringer must provide evidence that he did not use the 
patented process – which may be sometimes an impossible task.319  To further define the 
question raised above: does the special character of process patents regarding farm animal 
genetic resources warrant a different use of these discretionary powers than for other 
inventions?  
 
In other fields of technology, the rationale for the rule of the burden of proof is perhaps 
easier to justify. A main difference between biotechnological inventions regarding 
processes for producing farm animal genetic resources and other technical inventions is 
that the product, or result, is not ‘produced’ in the traditional meaning of the word. 
Traditionally, farmers have the right to make use of their animals for further breeding. This 
can occur without the use of technical equipment and human intervention, as animals can 
mate naturally. For other technical inventions this is unthinkable. Today the use of artificial 
insemination has become widespread in commercial farming, but this does not mean it has 
become impossible to produce the ‘matter’ without recourse to patented processes. And 
thus the question is whether one can produce evidence of not having applied the method in 
question. This seems to involve assessments of a biological character, where it must be 
determined if an animal has been produced by the patented breeding method or if the 
animal could have been the result of natural occurrences or other breeding methods. The 
reversal of the burden of proof could seem more justifiable for technical inventions, as the 
technical details of the invention could make it possible to provide evidence of the use of 
alternative production methods.  
 
The discretion conferred upon the national judicial authorities is not absolute. If at least one 
of the circumstances described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) occurs, judges shall apply 
presumption of infringement, and have no discretionary authority to reverse the burden of 
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proof.320 On the other hand, it is up to the law to define which of the circumstances shall be 
seen as triggering the presumption.321 Some WTO Members have in fact preferred to 
establish the presumption in both events, thereby going further than they were obliged to 
do.322 The Norwegian Patents Act does not contain any provisions on the reversal of burden 
of proof. It is assumed that the Civil Procedure Act (Tvistemålsloven) would lead to the 
same result as that in TRIPS Article 34,323 but it is unclear whether this applies only to the 
discretionary authority or also to one or both of the obliged circumstances in alternatives 
(a) or (b). 
 
Any identical product produced without the consent of the patent-owner shall therefore, in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented 
process.324 However, this presupposes at least one of the following: 
 
(a) (…) the product obtained by the patented process is new; 
(b) (…) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process 
and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine 
the process actually used. (Emphasis added)  
 
Thus, the general rule of ‘reversal of burden proof’ does not apply unconditionally. It must 
be fairly evident that the product could have been made by the same process, and an 
attempt to prove this must have been made by the patent-holder. The implications of 
Article 34 are not easy to foresee for process patents in biotechnology regarding animal 
genetic resources. The fact that the products themselves are capable of self-reproduction 
might complicate efforts to determine if the process in question was used. This might 
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suggest an interpretation that accords some leeway as to the efforts required of the owner of 
the patent, cf. ‘through reasonable efforts’. However, if the burden of proof is reversed, it is 
not obvious that it would be possible to produce evidence that the product was made by 
another process. A method for selecting and breeding for certain desired traits, by 
identifying these traits in the animals and combining them with the appropriate genes in 
other animals, could possibly be repeated by a differing process, or indeed by natural 
mating. The effect of the reversal of burden of proof would then seem to rely on how the 
term ‘reasonable efforts’ is applied by the courts. Correa emphasizes that the requirement 
of ‘reasonable efforts’ on the part of the patent-holder, if appropriately applied, may help to 
limit possible abuses of patent holders in demanding the reversal of burden of proof and 
avoid ‘strategic litigation aimed at blocking legitimate competition’.325 As to process 
patents regarding farm animal production, it has been claimed that genetic companies in 
livestock breeding use patent policy to dominate gene markets.326 The appropriate 
application of ‘reasonable efforts’ could at least ensure that patent-holders are not granted 
rights to offspring that have been produced by means of other processes or methods.  
  
4.7 Other factors for interpretation of the scope of protection  
The point of departure for determining the scope of protection for process patents on 
breeding methods is that this is determined by the national courts after an interpretation of 
the patent legislation in accordance with the obligations of international and regional 
regulations. These include TRIPS Agreement Article 28.1 (b), EPC Article 64(2) and 
Biotech Directive Article 8(2). The following sections discuss whether there are other 
relevant factors that could be taken into account when interpreting the claims and 
establishing the scope of protection.   
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It has been claimed in patent theory that the level of inventiveness, in addition to being a 
requirement of patentability, could be relevant for determining the scope of protection.327 
The argument is that inventions that involve a large inventive step should be given a 
broader scope of protection than inventions that represent smaller innovative element.328 
Stenvik claims that recent case law does not support this liberal interpretation of inventions 
with a sizable inventive character.329 The opposite argument – that an invention with a 
small inventive step and in close proximity to the prior art, should be subject to restrictive 
interpretation when determining the scope of protection – has, however, been adduced in 
infringement cases.330 Here existing case law does not provide definite clarification, and 
Stenvik argues that legal unity weighs against this interpretation.331 One of the arguments 
against some process patents for animal breeding methods, currently at the application 
stage, is that they consist of general methods which are already in use.332 They only 
combine these existing elements to speed up the breeding cycle for selected traits.333 Some 
of the inventions have thus been argued to involve a small amount of inventiveness. 
Furthermore, when a field of technology is fairly new it can be difficult to establish the 
entirety of the prior art. Admitting the degree of inventiveness as part of the infringement 
assessment might therefore possibly ensure that the scope of these inventions is kept within 
justifiable limits. 
 
Whether the requirement of an inventive step could be of importance not only for granting 
the patent, but influence the scope of protection in the interpretation of the claims in an 
infringement case, has also been the subject of discussion in patent theory.334 This can be 
                                                 
327 Stenvik 2001, pp. 743–50 in chapter 9: ‘Equivalence’.  
328 Stenvik 2001, p. 744. 
329 Ibid.   
330 Rt. 1964, p. 1195, Rt. 1997, p. 1749.  
331 Stenvik 2001, p. 749.  
332 Fitzgerald 2004.  
333 Ibid.  
334 Stenvik 2006, p. 383, Stenvik 1999, pp. 610–612, 743–749. Ryberg 2002, pp. 121–133, Matheson 2006, 
pp. 16–18.  
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formulated as a question of whether the state of the art could call for a restrictive 
interpretation of claims, so that the invention is limited according to what was previously 
known or obvious.335 Stenvik argues that it is inevitable that some patents are granted 
despite the lack of inventiveness, and that revoking such patents – which is the 
countermeasure to this – is not satisfactory since this cannot, according to (for example) 
Norwegian law, be pleaded in an infringement proceeding.336 He therefore argues that 
norms for the assessment of patentability should be in accordance with the norms for the 
assessment of infringement, so as to ensure the public’s right to utilize the prior art.337 This 
could be ensured by means of a general restriction of the scope of protection, by allowing 
the defendant to allege that the subject-matter of the infringement was part of the prior art 
and was thus not subject to an exclusive right.338 In an infringement case, a restrictive 
interpretation could imply that actions that should be part of the prior art are not affected by 
the patent.339 Ryberg, on the other hand, claims that Stenvik’s considerations are not well-
founded arguments.340 Neither the wording of the Danish Patent Act § 39 (similar to the 
Norwegian provision) nor Article 69 of the EPC offers precise conclusions to whether this 
could be relevant as a means of interpreting claims when determining the scope of 
protection.341 There are however, in his opinion, no arguments that could support this 
solution.342 In fact, the consideration of fair protection for the patentee in the protocol of 
interpretation of Article 69 would not be upheld if new defences are introduced.343 On the 
basis of this, Ryberg argues that ensuring the right to exploit the prior art is best maintained 
through the provisions on revoking of patents, and that any other information about the 
                                                 
335 Matheson 2006, p. 16.  
336 Stenvik 2001. p. 610 cf. Norwegian Patents Act § 61.  
337 Ibid.  
338 Ibid.  
339 Stenvik 2006, p. 383.   
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prior art, other than that disclosed in the patent description, is generally without 
consequence for the scope of protection.344   
 
Whether the requirement of an inventive step can be used as a mean of interpretation of the 
scope of protection is as seen controversial. For biotechnological inventions there might be 
supplementary arguments that could support allowing the courts to consider the state of the 
art in connection with infringement proceedings. It has been argued that some process 
patents regarding farm animals are variations on natural occurring sequences, and thus do 
not fulfil the requirement of inventive step.345 Westerlund argues that the lack of 
understanding of biotechnological science, coupled with the unpredictability involved, 
entails a risk of inventions being given protection beyond their real contributions to the 
art.346 In other words there might be a risk of granting an exclusive right to a process (or the 
use of the product of this process) which to some extent exists independently of the 
inventive efforts of the patentee. This is could be considered inconsistent with the basics of 
the patent system:347 an applicant should not be awarded an exclusive right to an 
‘invention’ which is based on what was already known or beyond what the invention could 
justify. 
 
The fact that this field of technology is quite new could make it difficult to foresee how the 
technical development will proceed.348 This could imply difficulties in establishing prior art 
in connection with this technology, which in turn might lead to the granting of patents 
despite the lack of inventiveness. One remedy could be to allow for some flexibility in 
interpreting the scope of protection, by allowing interpretation of the claims based on the 
degree of inventiveness in the infringement proceedings, and to restrict claims that, after 
the granting of the patent, prove to be closely connected with the prior art. This could 
                                                 
344 Ryberg 2002, p. 133 
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346 Westerlund 2001, p. 184.  
347 Matheson 2006, p. 17.  
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provide the courts with the flexibility needed to adjust to this new and expanding field of 
technology, thus preventing patents with a too broad scope of protection,349 and ensuring 
that inventors are not rewarded beyond what can be justified through the patent system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
349 This was one of the ambitions when the Biotech Directive was implemented in Norway. See St.prp. Nr. 43 
2002-2003, p. 61.  
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5 Analysis of a process patent application for farm animal production  
 
5.1 General principles of claim interpretation applied on process patents on 
farm animal breeding 
Before analysing the process patent application some general principles of claim 
interpretation will be addressed. These principles of interpretation define the manner by 
which the subject-matter of the invention is determined. 
 
The extent of protection conferred on a patent-holder is determined by the claims of the 
patent, as these are interpreted.350 The claims are the inventor’s own description of the 
invention, and their primary function is to set out the scope of the legal protection to be 
conferred by the patent.351 Since the claims define the legal scope of the invention, much 
will depend on the exact wording used to explain the invention.352 EPC provisions require 
that, where appropriate, claims should be presented in two parts:353 one, called the 
‘preamble’, specifying the technical features of the invention which are necessary for the 
definition of the claimed subject-matter but which are already part of the prior art; and a 
second part that specifies the novel technical features that the applicant wishes to have 
protected.354 As with all linguistic material, the claims must be interpreted in order to 
determine their content.355 According to Article 69(1) of the EPC:  
 
The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent 
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description 
and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. 
 
                                                 
350 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 499, Stenvik 2006, p. 362.  
351 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 336.  
352 Westerlund 2001, p. 184.  
353 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 337 
354 EPC Rule 29(1)(b), EPO Guidelines C-III: 2. See also Bently and Sherman 2004, p. 356.   
355 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 336.   
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Claims constitute the starting point for both the evaluation of patentability and the 
assessment of an alleged infringement. The influence on the scope of protection through 
the interpretation of claims therefore includes two elements: first, the interpretation and 
defining of the claims in the patent-granting procedure; and second the interpretation in an 
infringement case, in other words, when the courts define the scope of protection to be 
compared with the alleged infringing process. A central concern in upholding the 
legitimacy of the patent system, given its aim of promoting technological development for 
the benefit of society, is to maintain a balance between inventors and third parties: ‘This 
balance is attained by properly defining the exclusive right so that it confers exclusivity 
relative to the contribution made by the inventor.’ 356  
 
Since claims define the scope of protection, then the way in which claims are interpreted is 
very important.357 The point of departure is that patents regarding processes for the 
production of farm animal genetic material shall be given similar protection as other 
technical inventions.358 They should thus be subject to the same principles of interpretation 
as any other invention.359 One concern regarding such patents has been that, under the 
current system, they would confer a broad scope of protection on the patentee.360 A 
paramount objective of patent law is argued to be to reward the inventor for his effort, 
proportionate to his contributions to the field of technology, as an incentive for the future 
production of new inventions.361 The following presentation will analyse the general 
principles of interpretation and how these are applied to process patents on farm animal 
breeding methods. Another objective is to see whether applying the general principles of 
interpretation to this area of technology could lead to differences in the scope of protection, 
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consequently resulting in broader protection than the traditional justification of the patent 
system could support.  
 
All patent applications will be subject to an interpretation in the granting procedure. With 
infringement assessment, however, interpretation by the courts will depend on a case being 
filed against the allegedly infringing user of the invention. Although the point of departure 
is that the understanding of the claims shall be the same for both situations,362 the 
evaluation is somewhat different. For the evaluation of patentability, applications are 
interpreted and examined to ensure that they comply with the formalities of filing as well as 
the four requirements of subject-matter, novelty, non-obviousness and industrial 
applicability.363 The patent claims are thus compared with written sources published prior 
to the application date. By contrast, for assessing infringement, the question is whether the 
alleged infringer has made use of the process described in the claims,364 or the product 
obtained through the process. The patent is thus interpreted and the result of this 
interpretation is compared with the actual acts that the alleged infringer has performed.  
 
The interests of the patentee could call for some leeway in interpretation. A strictly literal 
interpretation could make it possible to circumvent the patent by simply making minor 
alterations to the invention.365 Westerlund argues that ‘to describe every possible variant of 
a broad claim is often burdensome for the inventor’,366 and the argument seems to be based 
on recognition that an applicant cannot be expected to specify and formulate his claims in a 
manner that would cover all possible circumventions. Indeed, even if this were possible, it 
might not be rational from a socio-economic perspective. For processes regarding farm 
animal breeding methods this could seem even more evident, in view of the ability of the 
protected products to self-reproduce and further evolve. The need for some flexibility in 
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claim formulation has led to an interpretation practice that opens for exclusivity beyond 
what can be read directly out of the claims, hereunder the implementation in some 
jurisdictions of the Doctrine of Equivalence.367 The extent of this doctrine was to a certain 
degree established when the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 was given an 
addition in the revision in 2000.368 Article 2 – Equivalents states: 
 
For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a European patent, due 
account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in the 
claims. (Emphasis added) 
  
And yet, there are other interests that need to be taken in to account. It must be possible for 
a third party to act in accordance with existing protected inventions. If too much can be 
read into the patent claims and considerable exclusiveness is granted outside the literal 
understanding of these claims, the risk of patent infringement might increase. Furthermore, 
as claims demarcate the scope of the monopoly, if the claims are not clearly formulated, 
then the extent of protection cannot easily be discerned: ‘This would lead to the undesirable 
situation where third parties would not be able to determine whether they were infringing 
the patent.’ 369 In the field of animal breeding this could prove even more important. In 
light of the fact that the patented materials are able to ‘reinvent’ themselves, and the 
indirect product protection that could apply, farmers operating within the range of a given 
patent should be able to know with some certainty what actions fall within the protection of 
that patent. And since, throughout the protection period, the farmer will usually ‘own’ the 
animal(s) in question and thus what is produced by the patented process (in contrast to 
plant agriculturists, who will have to buy the patented seeds every sowing season), it is 
important to ensure a certain level of predictability regarding the uses to which the owner 
of the animal is entitled without infringing on the patent. It could be argued that the claims 
                                                 
367 See chapter 4.2.3. For an in-depth analysis see Stenvik 1999, chapter 9; regarding equivalency in 
biotechnological patents, see Westerlund 2001, chapter 5. 
368 Stenvik 2006, p. 365.  
369 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 338.  
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therefore ought to be formulated in such a way that the public should not be left in any 
doubt as to the subject-matter covered by a particular patent.370 The converse could create 
unnecessary legal proceedings and increase the costs of patent enforcement. The existence 
of a regional patent organization like the EPO, which grants patents that enter into force in 
all member states without linguistic translation, further underlines the importance of 
predictability in establishing the scope of protection. The EPO has addressed the need for 
predictability to enable third parties to act in accordance with patent claims. In Oxy/Gel 
Forming Composition,371 the Technical Board found that a patent with 157 claims violated 
EPC Art. 84 and EPC r.29(5), and stated that ‘patents should not be allowed to erect a legal 
maze or smokescreen in front of potential users of the invention to which they lay 
claim’.372  
    
The balance between these differing interests is addressed in the EPC Protocol on the 
Interpretation of Article 69, which is an integral part of the convention.373 It states that  
 
Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of the protection conferred 
by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the 
wording used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only for the 
purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims.  
 
This seems to be based on the concern that a purely verbal description of the invention may 
not entirely cover the contributions made.374 One issue is therefore to what extent the 
protection extends beyond the exact wording of the claims,375 and it is emphasized that the 
claims should neither be  
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(…) interpreted in the sense that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual 
protection conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the description and 
drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplated.  
 
This addresses the interest of third parties, and the limiting of the breadth of the scope. The 
result should be an interpretation  
 
[that defines] a position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for the 
patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. 
 
In harmonizing any law, let alone an area as complex as patent law, compromises have to 
be reached, and the Protocol is such a compromise.376 It sets out two extremes of 
interpretation – the literalist approach and the broad guideline approach – and requires 
courts to seek a compromise that can balance protection of the interest of the patentee in 
preserving a broad monopoly with due regard for the need for others – subsequent 
inventors, users and other infringers – ‘to know where they stand in a way that, for all its 
other faults, the literal approach allows them.’377 Holyoak and Torremans, however, argue 
that this compromise implies moving to a looser approach with broader methods of 
interpretation, consequently also moving towards greater protection to the patentee; thus, 
they hold, more risk of infringement is placed on others who are now to be offered only 
reasonable degree of certainty as opposed to the utter certainty of the literal approach.378 
For patents in the field of biotechnology, this concern could prove even more relevant. As 
such inventions may consist of naturally occurring living material capable of reproducing 
itself, it might be difficult to define the patentable subject-matter for which protection is 
sought, especially in the case of the product of a process for the production of an animal. 
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Westerlund stresses some of these concerns: 
 
The biotechnological decisions demonstrate certain difficulties in its application to these 
kinds of inventions, for instance, the problem of elucidating the relevant dissimilarities, but 
also for considering the significant level that put ‘different’ matter outside protection. More 
basic is also the question of how to understand ‘element’ of a claim regarding 
biotechnological inventions, such as product claims or processes that include the use of 
biological starting material etc.379  
 
This suggests that it is difficult to clearly define the subject-matter of biotechnological 
inventions.  A broad interpretation of the claims, to include equivalent use of the 
inventions, could therefore possibly aggravate the difficulty of upholding a certain level of 
predictability regarding the scope of protection. Another consequence of broad patents has 
been emphasized by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics: 
 
The granting of too many broad patents at too early a point in the development of an 
emerging area of science may restrict others from having access to the genetic information 
covered by the patents (…).380 
 
This suggests that, in the interpretation of patent claims in an emerging area of science like 
biotechnological process patents in farm animal production, consideration should be given 
to the significant characteristics of the patented subject-matter. It would be the claim 
interpretation that in the final instance will determine the scope of protection; and if a great 
amount can be read into the claims as the invention ‘evolves’, the consequence might be a 
broad kind of protection that could act to restrict the use of others.  
 
The considerations in the Protocol of the interpretation of Article 69 should be borne in 
mind when interpreting process patents in farm animal genetic resources, as for any other 
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technical area. The question remains whether there are other distinctions for these patents 
that would imply different considerations when interpreting and establishing the scope of 
protection. In general, a term in a claim is to be interpreted according to the understanding 
of a person skilled in the art, provided that the description does not contain a deviating 
definition. Normally, an invention shall be defined by its technical features. However, in 
the case of biotechnological inventions, the EPO frequently allows functional, as opposed 
to technical, terms in the claims. 381 ‘A functional claim defines the invention by reference 
to the function or end it performs, rather than its structure or elements.’382 In other words, 
instead of specifying what the invention is, a functional claim outlines what the invention 
does.383 This practice is based on recognition of the fact that it is often impossible to define 
biotechnological inventions by technical terms, or it is only possible to use technical terms 
which unduly restrict the scope of the claims.384 At first glance this practice seems to open 
for biotechnological patents that have a broader scope than in other technical areas, at least 
from a literal perspective. One rationale for using technical terms is to ensure that inventors 
are given an adequate scope of protection in accordance with their contribution to the 
particular field of technology, and that it should be possible for a person skilled in the art to 
reproduce the process thus described. If a functional term is used in a biotechnological 
patent claim, this could suggest that the functional term does not extend the scope of 
protection, although a literal interpretation might result in this, since the reason for using 
the term is either that a comparable technical term might be impossible to find, or the use 
of such a term would restrict the scope of the claim. Functional terms could be argued to be 
given a stricter interpretation than the literal understanding would suggest, since the reason 
for allowing the use of these terms is the fact that it is impossible to describe the claim 
using technical terms. Under the EPO, functional claims are permissible ‘if from an 
objective point of view, such features cannot otherwise be defined more precisely without 
restricting the scope of the claim, and if these features provide instructions which are 
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sufficiently clear for the skilled person to reduce them to practice without undue burden.’385 
This should imply that the use of functional terms is not admissible if employing them 
would lead to an unclear or broader scope of protection.   
 
With these principles in mind, the next sections will analyse a current pending patent 
application regarding a process in farm animal breeding, and try to foresee what scope of 
protection this might confer on the patent-holder if granted. We will also enquire how this 
patent could restrict the use of individual animals produced by this breeding method.  
5.2 A patent application regarding a process for genetic improvement of 
terminal boars  
Currently, there are several pending patent applications regarding processes in field of farm 
animal genetic resources.386 It is still uncertain whether they will be granted or not, since 
they have been filed through the system of the PCT/WIPO, which only performs a 
preliminary prior art search.387 Granting of the patent is at the discretion of the patent 
offices regionally or nationally after the search report is submitted together with the 
application. After grant, the scope of protection for these inventions and implications they 
might impose on the users of the patent and their herds of farm animals will then be 
determined on the national level by the courts in an infringement proceeding, should such 
occur. As seen from the interpretations made in sections 4.2 – 4.3 there is uncertainty 
regarding the interpretation of the provisions for the scope of process patents on farm 
animal breeding methods. The following sections will analyse the considerations the courts 
will have to take in regard to one specific patent application if it is granted. Furthermore, 
the section will provide an analysis of the scope of protection this patent would confer to 
the patentee in regards to the process, the animals produced and the progeny of such 
animals. In other words, we will see how this patent could establish exclusive rights that 
might influence the legal situations for third parties like farmers and breeders working 
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within the range of the patent. Subsequently, we examine how third parties can execute 
their property rights in modern breeding without the risk of infringing the intellectual 
property rights of the patent-holder.   
 
The patent chosen for study here involves a method for genetic improvement of terminal 
boars.388 According the description, the term ‘terminal boar’ refers ‘to a boar that is used to 
sire progeny that are harvested for pork.’389 The reason for choosing this patent is that it 
contains claims that touch upon several of the interpretational questions raised above. This 
relates inter alia to indirect product protection and to the questions raised in section 4.3.2 
and 4.4 of when the patent right is exhausted, both in terms of the patented breeding 
method and the progeny obtained. In other words: for how many generations and 
alterations is the offspring subject to the intellectual property rights of the patentee? 
Furthermore, by extension: how far does the scope of protection extend to progeny of 
animals that have been bred with animals independent of the patented process? These 
queries can be formulated as a question of the correlation between the rights of the breeders 
to use the animals that are subject to their property rights, and the patentee’s right to 
enforce his intellectual property right.   
 
Another reason for choosing the case of this patent application is that it has already caused 
controversy. In an article from 2 August 2005,390 it is claimed that if this patent is granted, 
the holder of the patent can legally prevent breeders and farmers from breeding pigs whose 
characteristics are described in the patent claims, or else force them to pay royalties. This is 
perhaps an exaggeration to some extent. In general, a process patent would only restrict the 
use of animals produced by this patent – in other words, in order for farmers to be subject 
to licence fees, they would initially need to have requested the use of the patented process. 
The following will also analyse and the scope of the patent application based on the 
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interpretation of the relevant provisions, inter alia to see whether the criticism and 
scepticism voiced towards this patent seem reasonable. 
5.2.1 Patent claims in the patent application under study  
The patent application concerning a method for genetic improvement of terminal boars 
contains 69 specific claims, and each patent claim forms an independent subject-matter for 
an exclusive right. In other words, each of the patent claims would grant an independent 
and exclusive right. They might, however, also refer to other claims and be combined with 
these. Each individual claim needs therefore to be read individually but also in the context 
of the claims referred to, in order to get a complete overview of the entire subject-matter to 
be covered by the patent. The objective of the invention is to provide a method for 
producing terminal parent animals in swine production: a breeding method aimed at 
improving the genetic base of a population of pigs. Claim 1 is an independent claim; it 
describes the breeding plan of the invention and implies an independent exclusive right to 
the process described. It includes ‘a method for producing terminal swine parent animals 
having improved germplasm, the method comprising’: 
 
a. providing at least one genetic nucleus herd and/or a target herd for which improvement is 
desired  
b. selecting a trait or traits, for which improvement is desired;  
c. providing semen aliquots from an elite sire selected from the genetic nucleus (GN) herd 
wherein the elite sire has a desired germplasm that is determinative for improving one or 
more selected trait (s) in the target herd;  
d. using the semen aliquots to impregnate a correlative number of breeding females in a 
target herd; wherein the semen from the elite sire is used to breed substantially all of the 
females in the target herd;  
e. producing half-sib offspring having improved germplasm when compared with the 
breeding females in the target herd; and  
f. providing at least one of the half-sib offspring as the terminal swine parent in a SP (swine 
production herd), or as a replacement animal for the GN herd, or as a replacement animal 
for the target herd, whereby the genetics are improved in the target herd and/or SP. 
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The improvement of the genetic base of a population of pigs is accomplished by providing 
methods for introducing and/or fixing one or more desirable traits or alleles in a swine 
herd. Alternatively, the methods may be employed to eliminate a given undesirable trait or 
gene. The method shall enable one of ordinary skill in the art to rapidly modify swine herds 
by such means as introducing a desirable trait and/or allele or increasing its frequency.391 
 
Basically, in layman terms: the farmer starts out with one herd that he wants to improve, 
finds the characteristics that he wants improved, identifies animals that possess these 
characteristics and uses their sperm to impregnate the females of the herd, produces 
improved next generations and places one or more of the improved animals back into the 
herd. 392 More technically, the method described in Claim 1 starts out with a core group and 
a herd that is to be improved by the breeding method. The selection is based on one or 
more desired traits to improve. The characteristics that are sought to be improved include 
(but are not limited to) health traits, reproduction traits, meat quality traits and efficient 
growth traits.393 Semen is collected from one selected elite male which is genetically 
superior to the average of the flock. This semen is used to artificially impregnate several 
females in the herd. The offspring of this process are then used as parents in production 
herds or as replacements in the core group to improve the genetics of this herd.394 
Seemingly, and according to some critics,395 these six steps describe, in basic terms, the 
long-established fundamentals and basic principles of selective breeding. If this particular 
patent is granted, the claim would, however, grant an exclusive right to deny others the 
right to repeat this procedure without paying the required licence fee. 
 
Claim 1 serves as a basis for a number of other claims. Claim 7 is a dependent claim (a 
claim in combination with Claim 1); it describes the method of Claim 1 wherein the 
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selected elite sire is selected for the property of having germplasm favourable for providing 
offspring with at least one of several traits. It describes: 
 
[t]he method of claim 1 wherein the selected elite sire is selected for as having germplasm 
favorable for providing offspring having at least one of the following:  
• one or more desired qualitative or economic trait locus/loci;  
• one or more desired quantitative trait locus/loci a desired estimated breeding value 
(EBV);  
• a desired genotype or phenotype;  
• one or more desired health trait (s),  
• one or more desired meat quality trait (s),  
• one or more desired reproduction trait (s); or  
• one or more desired efficient growth trait (s). (Punctuation added).   
 
Additionally, the offspring of the breeding method are covered by Claim 8, which 
describes:  
 
The method of claim 1 comprising identifying female half-sib offspring having preferred 
germplasm and retaining these female half-sib offspring as breeding females in the target 
herd. (Emphasis added).  
 
This would imply that the process confers an exclusive right to the breeding plan described 
in Claim 1, where the selection criterion is based on one or more of the traits listed in 
Claim 7. Furthermore, the patent covers using the animals of the applied breeding method 
as breeding animals in the target herd. 
 
Claim 7 includes selection of one elite sire for having germplasm favourable in terms of 
providing one or more desired qualitative or economic trait locus/loci or more desired 
quantitative trait locus/loci. The term ‘locus’ here refers to a specific location on a 
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chromosome, e.g. where a gene or marker is located.396 Furthermore, it includes selection 
based on desired estimated breeding value or a desired genotype or phenotype. Phenotypic 
characteristics are basically the characteristics of the animal that can easily be detected. 
Genotypic characteristic refers to what can be described as the fundamental constitution of 
an animal in terms of its hereditary factors: in other words, the desired traits are selected on 
the genetic level. The traits are not specified in Claim 7. This implies that the exclusiveness 
to the breeding plan of Claim 1 and 7 combined covers selection based on the general trait 
descriptions in Claim 7. Moreover, this must be read in conjunction with several other 
claims. For example, in Claim 39, growth traits are said to include any trait selected from a 
list that includes average daily gain, average daily feed intake, feed efficiency, back fat 
thickness, loin muscle area, and lean percentage. In other words, if combined with Claim 1, 
7 or 8 this would also grant an exclusive right to a process selecting on the basis of any one 
of the specified traits described in Claim 39.  
 
Meat traits could, according to Claim 40, mean any trait selected from a list consisting of 
muscle pH, purge loss, muscle colour, firmness and marbling scores, intramuscular fat 
percentage, and tenderness. The process described in Claim 1, 7 or 8 where the selection is 
based on e.g. firmness and marbling scores would therefore be covered by the exclusive 
right of the patent.  
 
Reproductive traits could, according to Claim 41, refer to any trait selected from a list 
consisting of number of piglets born per litter, piglet birth weight, piglet survival rate, pigs 
weaned per litter, litter weaning weight, age at puberty, farrowing rate, days to oestrus, and 
semen quality. The patentee could therefore deny others the right to perform the breeding 
plan described in Claim 1, 7 or 8, if the selection criterion is based on, for example, number 
of piglets born per litter.   
 
                                                 
396 Description Para [0060].  
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Furthermore, health traits could, according to Claim 42, be any trait selected from a group 
consisting of the absence of undesirable physical abnormalities or defects, improvement of 
foot and leg soundness, resistance to specific diseases or disease organisms, or general 
resistance to pathogens.  
 
These qualities or traits appear quite comprehensive in the description. They seem to 
include a broad range of different traits, each one of which could be chosen as a selection 
criterion in the breeding scheme listed in Claim 1. Thus, a systematic breeding scheme as 
described in Claim 1 where at least one selected trait is an efficient growth trait, meat 
quality trait, reproduction trait, or health trait selected from one of the groups listed in 
Claims 39–42 and chosen as the third step, could not be repeated without risk of infringing 
the patent. Furthermore, Claim 8 describes the method of Claim 1 where these genotypic 
traits are identified in female half-sib offspring having preferred germplasm and retaining 
these female half-sib offspring as breeding females in the target herd. The scope of 
protection for the breeding plan therefore extends to the further breeding of the animals 
obtained, in the target herd. Thus, also the use of the progeny of the applied process is 
restricted for this purpose.  
 
Based on the described claims, read as individual exclusive rights and as a whole, this 
patent application would appear to be broad indeed, covering a wide range of selection 
criterion for the selective breeding method. It would seem that the possibilities of direct 
infringing acts regarding this method would be numerous, since selective breeding, in the 
direct meaning of Claim 1, based on any of the mentioned selection criterion, would 
constitute infringement.  Additionally, the doctrine of equivalence is applied to varying 
extents in different jurisdictions. This could imply that potentially infringing acts could 
extend to acts exceeding the literal interpretation of the described breeding method of 
Claim 1.  
 
This raises two questions when coupled with the general patent law determining the scope 
of protection. First of all, regarding licensed users who apply the patented process: what 
 99
acts are restricted regarding the progeny of the process applied? Secondly, regarding the 
use of other breeding methods within production of the same type of farm animal: which 
processes fall outside the direct or equivalent scope of the process? Might animals 
produced by alternative breeding methods but possessing some of the same characteristics 
risk being alleged to have been produced by the patented method? These questions will in 
the following be addressed based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Biotech Directive.    
5.2.2 Possible implications for the licensed user of the breeding method 
The claims in the chosen patent application describe a large number of different traits or 
qualities that can be used as selection criteria in the selective breeding scheme. They 
include, as mentioned, both genotypic and phenotypic traits. The patent application aims at 
producing genetically improved animals for the purpose of re-placing these animals into 
the production herd or the GN (genetic nucleus herd), but improvement is also sought 
independently in the target herd and the swine production herd.397 The point of departure in 
TRIPS Agreement Article 28.1(b) is that the scope of protection extends to ‘at least’ the 
products ‘obtained directly’ by the patented process. As mentioned in sections 4.2 and 4.4, 
the assessment of whether subsequent animals can be said to be ‘obtained directly’ by the 
patented process will depend inter alia on whether the progeny has lost its ‘identity’ or not. 
In the Biotech Directive Article 8(2) this is specified to whether the progeny still possesses 
the ‘same characteristics’ as enabled by the patented process. Regarding the patent 
application described above, this would imply that the scope of protection extends to all 
future progeny that possess any one of the traits used as selection criterion. This would 
include both the general definition of the traits, e.g. Claim 7, and the specified traits of 
Claims 39 to 41. We must then ask: what acts of use is the breeder is not allowed to 
perform without the consent of the patent-holder, regarding individual animals in his herd?  
 
First of all, is the farmer allowed to cross the obtained animals with other animals, 
independent of the patented breeding plan? This seems to imply a question of whether this 
                                                 
397 Claims 14–17. 
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act represents a use of the patented process. If it is not deemed a use of the process, the 
question remains whether crossing with another animal could be considered ‘use’ of the 
product obtained by the patented process. The described method consists of a systematic 
selection of certain animals that possess specific traits. Crossing with other animals by 
means of a different process would therefore seemingly not directly infringe the process.398 
If breeding with an independent animal is not deemed as an infringing use of the patented 
process, might the patent-holder still enforce his rights by means of the indirect product 
protection? The question is whether the offspring of a crossing between one animal 
obtained by ‘that process’ and one animal not obtained by ‘that process’ is subject to 
indirect product protection. According to Biotech Directive Article 8(2), the scope of 
protection extends to any ‘biological material derived from the directly obtained material 
through propagation or multiplication’. So far it seems as though the offspring would be 
covered. Article 8(2) does, however, require that the biological material possesses the same 
characteristics as those that the patented process enabled the animals to acquire. Regarding 
the above described patent application, the question of whether the patent-holder is 
conferred an indirect product protection to the offspring seems therefore to depend on 
whether the offspring can be said to possess any of the traits described in e.g. Claim 7 or 
Claims 39 to 41. If the offspring is deemed to possess any of these traits, the exclusiveness 
applies, regardless of whether these animals appear in identical or divergent form. That in 
turn means that this patent, if granted, would in practice cover any progeny and any other 
biological material that possessed the characteristics described in the claims, in identical or 
divergent form, if the animals can be said to derive from the directly obtained material. The 
acts of use of this progeny are restricted according to the provisions of TRIPS Article 28.1 
(b). (See section 4.4.)  
 
Certain specific forms of propagation and multiplication are, however, exempted from the 
exclusive right of the patent-holder by the provisions of Articles 10 of the Biotech 
Directive (see section 4.5). On the background of the exemption, the patent-holder can 
                                                 
398 However, it might be considered an equivalent use of the process, depending on how the doctrine of 
equivalence is applied. 
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deny further use of the directly obtained material where the patented material is 
subsequently used for other propagation or multiplication than what necessarily results 
from applying the process. The question would then be whether crossing with an 
independent animal by means of a different breeding method could be considered as ‘what 
necessarily results from the application of the process’ described in section 5.2. The 
prerequisite of the exemption in Article 10 is that the material obtained is not used for other 
propagation or multiplication. Using the material in a different breeding method could 
therefore fall under patent protection, if this is considered as use for other propagation or 
multiplication. Furthermore, if the breeding plan is used to improve meat quality traits, the 
multiplication would seem to be limited to this, and would not allow the material to be used 
for other multiplication. 
5.2.3 Possible implications for other breeders in the same field of animal 
production 
The point of departure in an infringement proceeding is a comparison between the patented 
method and the suspected infringing use. The assessment of a third party would be parallel, 
when applying a similar breeding method and considering whether the breeding method in 
use could potentially infringe an existing patent. As seen above in section 5.1, this 
evaluation includes an interpretation of the claim that balances between a literal 
understanding of the claims and the approach where the claims serve more as a guideline; 
and where the actual protection conferred may extend to what, from an interpretation of the 
claims, can be considered an equivalent use. 
 
The claims in this patent application describe a large number of different traits or qualities 
that can be used as selection criteria in the selective breeding scheme. A method that 
selects elite sire and subsequent half-sib offspring on the basis of any of the above 
described traits could therefore be at risk of infringing the method, provided that the 
breeding plan falls within the direct literal understanding of the claims. The described 
breeding method might, however, imply exclusiveness beyond the literal understanding of 
the claims. The doctrine of equivalence is applied in some jurisdictions, and it implies that 
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protection extends to some degree to utilization of the patent also beyond the direct 
meaning of the claims.399  
 
According to Fitzgerald, the breeding plan of the application describes very general 
methods of cross-breeding and selection, using artificial insemination and other breeding 
methods already in general use. Furthermore, that the main invention is nothing more than 
a particular combination of these elements designed to speed up the breeding cycle for 
selected traits, in order to make the animals more commercially profitable.400 The result 
could therefore appear to be a general method of cross-breeding where the selection criteria 
cover both the qualities that can be observed (phenotypic), and also the qualities on the 
genetic level (genotypic), and involves a wide variety of traits to improve. This includes 
selective breeding to improve health traits, meat quality traits, reproduction traits and 
growth traits, generally or specified to certain specific categories of these traits, as 
described in Claims 39 to 42. In view of the comprehensiveness of these claims, one 
question that seems obvious for pig breeders and farmers to ask is: what processes are not 
included in the patent? What acts can they perform without risking patent infringement?  
With my limited knowledge of breeding methods, (based on discussions with cand. agric 
E. Fimland), this question is not easy to answer. It implies a combination of biological and 
legal assessments. However, the basis of comparison can be found in the claims of patent 
application WO/2005/015989 as described in section 5.2. 
 
The question of the possibility of creating and using breeding methods that fall outside the 
described application could also concern the animals produced by such alternative breeding 
methods. The point of departure is that animals produced by these methods fall outside the 
scope of the exclusiveness of the patent. However, when the selection criteria of the 
patented invention involve large numbers of desirable traits, selected at the phenotypic and 
the genotypic level, an alternative method might risk producing animals with the same 
characteristics. A breeder who had produced animals with any of these traits might 
                                                 
399 See Westerlund 2001, chapter 5 and Stenvik 2001, chapter 9.  
400 Fitzgerald 2005.  
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additionally, due to TRIPS Article 34, be obliged to produce evidence that his animals had 
in fact been produced using another method. An extensive process might ensure for third 
parties and stakeholders in the same industry, also depending on the difficulty of producing 
such evidence. If the process patent is so extensive that it might restrict the use of other 
similar processes, it could even shift the balance within the market. Similarly, if the 
extensiveness of the process makes it almost impossible to prove that the offspring was 
produced by another method. It could then be argued that the patent-holder had achieved a 
reward for his invention that exceeded what the rationale of the patent system could defend. 
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6 Concluding remarks  
 
Patent protection of process for farm animal production opens for several interpretational 
questions regarding the scope of protection and the use of following generations of the 
applied process. The TRIPS Agreement imposes a basis for harmonization of patent law by 
providing minimum standards for protection of inventions in all fields of technology. Being 
technology-neutral, the rules of the Agreement could apply differently used on areas that 
differ from traditional technologies. For the protection of biotechnological inventions in the 
EU/EEA, these differences have been taken into consideration and exclusive rights to 
patents in this area further specified through the provisions of the 1998 EC Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions – the ‘Biotech Directive’.  
 
The right to exploit the genetic resources of animals produced by patented processes is an 
issue that engages and affects many stakeholders – ranging from international genetics and 
breeding companies, farmers of varying scales, pastoralists, environmental organizations 
and patent-holders, to international organizations dealing with intellectual property or food 
and agriculture, like the FAO of the UN. The wide range of stakeholders and their differing 
affiliations to genetic resources may imply particular challenges when it comes to imposing 
intellectual property rights on the resources. The ability to make use of and adjust to patent 
law could vary for different stakeholders.  Although patent-holders and third parties may 
have somewhat contradictory interests, predictability is especially important when the 
product obtained by the patented process is a living entity capable of self-reproduction. 
From the patent-holder’s perspective, predictability could be important because of the 
biological characteristic of the products obtained, since these characteristics imply that the 
animals could constantly evolve. Since animals may be subject to constant improvement 
and crossing, it is vital to know the scope of protection for determining how far the 
exclusive right extends regarding such evolved animals. For commercial breeders and 
farmers, predictability in the legislation could determine the range of their breeding 
activities, as patents could restrict the use of offspring for further propagation or sale for 
breeding purposes.  
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From a literal interpretation perspective and the discussion above, it could be asked 
whether applying general patent protection through the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, specified in the Biotech Directive, goes beyond the level of protection in other 
fields of technology. According to Preamble Recital 46 of the Biotech Directive, which 
especially addresses such issues, state that the protection is to be ‘analogous’. However, 
based on the interpretation above in chapter 4 and the analysis of a pending patent 
application in chapter 5, it seems as the scope of protection regarding the progeny resulting 
from an applied process is quite wide-ranging. The interpretation could thus imply an 
extension of the scope of protection by granting the patent-holder rights to almost anything 
derived from the propagation or multiplication. Whether this would be the result of an 
infringement proceeding is yet to see. However it would not seem to fully correspond with 
the general incentives underlying patent law.  
 
As noted, a central concern in upholding the legitimacy of the patent system is the balance 
between inventors and third parties for the purpose of promoting technological 
development for the benefit of society.401 If applying general patent protection to 
biotechnological processes in farm animal breeding de facto extends the protection further 
than for other technical processes, and this extension was an unintended consequence, it 
could then be held that the relevant provisions could, to counteract this, be interpreted more 
narrowly when applied to biotechnological inventions for the production of animals. This 
could be argued in light of the rationale of the patent system, as the contrary could reward 
the inventor to a greater extent than justified by the system. In establishing the scope of 
protection for biotechnological processes, legislators should ensure that the scope of the 
patent rights granted is proportionate to the invention, but such scope should also be 
‘analogous’ with the scope of patent rights provided in other areas of technology. Such 
assessment might prove difficult also because of great variations within species and the 
way in which they are utilized.402  
                                                 
401 Westerlund 2001, p. 77.  
402 Rischkowsky and Pilling 2007, Part 1 Section B.  
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In farm animal breeding, the animals that are subject to improvement through a patented 
process will normally be owned by breeders or farmers who apply the patented breeding 
method on their stock. The difficult question is to what extent the patent-holder attains 
rights to the animals that are obtained through the process. Based on the interpretation of 
the TRIPS Agreement and the Biotech Directive made in this thesis one could ask if 
patented processes in farm animal breeding restricts the use farmers and breeders property. 
The animals of a breeder’s herd are part of his property, and in the debates surrounding the 
Directive, one of the fears raised was that patent protection over biological inventions 
would have a negative impact on traditional farm practices.403 The Canadian Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee has held that granting exclusive rights that extend not only to the 
particular organism embodying the invention but also to all subsequent progeny of that 
organism could represent an increase in the scope of rights granted to patent-holders; 
furthermore, that this represents a greater transfer of economic interests from the 
agricultural community to the biotechnology industry than exists in other fields of 
science.404 If, due to the intellectual property rights, the ‘acts of use’ the farmers or 
breeders are entitled to perform are restricted to a greater extent than the property rights 
would indicate, it could thus be argued the Biotech Directive implies a shift in the balance 
between intellectual property and traditional property. Such a shift might be inconsistent 
with the basic principles that legitimize the patent system.  
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the Biotech 
Directive should be given an interpretation that both secures the patent-holder’s right to be 
rewarded for the invention, and upholds the property rights of farmers and their possibility 
to utilize the resources belonging to them. On the other hand, adequate patent protection is 
perhaps not possible without including (at least to a certain extent) the use of future 
generations produced from the patented process. Moreover, given the strong financial 
                                                 
403 Bently and Sherman 2001, p. 510.  
404 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2002, p. 12.    
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incentives405 and the desire to conquer this frontier technology,406 a certain reduction in 
farmers’ property rights may prove to be a necessary and perhaps even acceptable 
consequence. 
 
The legal situation regarding these questions has not been fully determined by 
implementation of the Biotech Directive or through court interpretation of its provisions. It 
remains to be seen whether the large number of patent applications currently pending in 
this area of technology will be granted, as well as how the courts of differing jurisdictions 
will interpret the patents and determine the scope of protection. This is an issue that may 
well affect large numbers of participants in the global market of farm animal food 
production.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
405 See Biotech Directive Preamble recital 1–2. 
406 See Biotech Directive Preamble recital 3. 
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7 Appendix   
 
7.1 Patent search on biotechnological process patents in WIPO 
 
 (WO/2006/134579) METHOD FOR PREVENTING THE INACTIVATION, DUE 
TO SPECIFIC BACTERIOPHAGES, OF PROBIOTIC STRAIN MIXTURES 
USED IN CATTLE-BREEDING. 
 (WO/2006/125745) 1-(1,2-DIPHENYL-ETHYL)-3-(2-HYDROXYETHYL)-
THIOUREA COMPOUNDS FOR COMBATING ANIMAL PESTS 
 (WO/2006/108255) A SYSTEM AND A METHOD OF INDIVIDUALIZATION 
OF ANIMALS AND HERD MANAGEMENT. 
 (WO/2006/103905) FEED COMPOSITION AND METHOD OF BREEDING 
ANIMAL 
 (WO/2006/101623) CSTF1 AND C20ORF43 MARKERS FOR MEAT QUALITY 
AND GROWTH RATE IN ANIMALS 
 (WO/2006/073447) ENRICHED PAG-55 FRACTION AND METHODS FOR 
EARLY DETECTION OF PREGNANCY IN UNGULATE ANIMALS. 
 (WO/2006/052994) SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR IMPROVING 
EFFICIENCIES IN AVIAN SPECIES 
 (WO/2006/042885) SYSTEM FOR BREEDING, RESTOCKING AND 
MAINTAINING RED-LEGGED PARTRIDGE AND OTHER ANIMALS WITH 
SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 (WO/2006/035513) AMPHIPLOID AQUATIC ANIMAL AND METHOD OF 
BREEDING THE SAME. 
 B
 (WO/2005/120219) FACILITIES AND METHOD FOR BREEDING ANIMAL 
OR PLANT, ANIMAL OR PLANT BRED BY THE FACILITIES AND METHOD 
AND APPARATUS FOR GENERATING ACTIVATED GAS. 
 (WO/2005/101230) SYTEMS AND METHODS FOR IMPROVING LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION.SPECIES).  
 (WO/2005/095590) ‘SPERM SUSPENSIONS FOR SORTING INTO X OR Y 
CHROMOSOME-BEARING ENRICHED POPULATIONS’ (NOT CONFINED 
TO ONE PARTICULAR SPECIES); 
 (WO/2005/094852) ‘SPERM SUSPENSIONS FOR USE IN INSEMINATION’ 
(NOT CONFINED TO ONE PARTICULAR SPECIES);  
 (WO/2005/017204) ‘USE SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISM IN THE 
CODING REGION OF THE PORCINE LEPTIN RECEPTOR GENE TO 
ENHANCE PORK PRODUCTION’; 
 (WO/2005/015989) ‘METHOD FOR GENETIC IMPROVEMENT OF 
TERMINAL BOARS’ (CONFINED TO SWINE BREEDING); 
 (WO/2004/088283) ‘APPARATUS AND METHODS FOR PROVIDING SEX-
SORTED ANIMAL SPERM’ (NOT CONFINED TO ONE PARTICULAR 
SPECIES); 
 (WO/2004/087177) ‘PROCESS FOR THE STAINING OF SPERM’ (NOT 
CONFINED TO ONE PARTICULAR SPECIES); 
 (WO/2004/059282) ‘METHOD AND MEANS FOR EARLY DETECTION OF 
PREGNANCY IN ANIMALS BY COMBINATION TESTING’ (NOT 
CONFINED TO ONE PARTICULAR SPECIES); 
 (WO/2004/003697) ‘SWINE GENETICS BUSINESS SYSTEM’; 
 (WO/2003/096799) ‘MULTIPLE CLONED NUCLEUS BREEDING FOR SWINE 
PRODUCTION’; 
 C
 (WO/2003/043524) ‘COMPOSITIONS AND METHODS FOR ACCURATE 
EARLY PREGNANCY DIAGNOSIS’ (NOT CONFINED TO ONE 
PARTICULAR SPECIES).407 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
407 Source: WIPO patent search; http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/  
